Is a Free Appropriate Public Education Really Free? How the Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with Autism by Reed, Leslie
San Diego Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 1 Article 8
2-1-2008
Is a Free Appropriate Public Education Really Free?
How the Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will
Adversely Impact Children with Autism
Leslie Reed
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego
Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leslie Reed, Is a Free Appropriate Public Education Really Free? How the Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with
Autism, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 251 (2008).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol45/iss1/8




Is a Free Appropriate Public Education 
Really Free?  How the Denial of Expert 
Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact 
Children with Autism 
LESLIE REED* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  PROLOGUE......................................................................................................... 252 
II.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 253 
III.  AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER AND ITS UNIQUENESS WITHIN  
  THE CONTEXT OF THE IDEA .............................................................................. 258 
A. Background of Autism Spectrum Disorder............................................... 258 
B. Early Intervention Strategies ................................................................... 261 
C. IDEA’s Promises to Children with ASD: FAPE, IEP, and  
 LRE .......................................................................................................... 263 
D. Procedural Safeguards to Secure a Substantive Right............................. 267 
IV.  SETTING THE PRECEDENT: ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL  
  DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION V. MURPHY........................................................ 272 
A. The Majority Opinion .............................................................................. 274 
 * J.D. Candidate 2008, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 2004 
University of California, Santa Barbara.  Special thanks to the Volume 44 and 45 
Editorial Boards of San Diego Law Review, especially my Comment Editor, M. Oanh 
Ho, for her helpful insight.  My sincerest gratitude to my Comment Advisor and mentor, 
Professor Margaret Dalton, Esq., who is the most influential, inspiring individual I have 
met throughout my law school experience.  I would not have been able to achieve the 
degree of specificity required for this Comment without her constant guidance and 
profound knowledge of Special Education Law.  Furthermore, I dedicate this Comment 
to my dearest nephew, Pierce, who has been my inspiration throughout the entire writing 
process. 




B. The Dissent .............................................................................................. 280 
C. Understanding the Arlington Court’s Choice of  
 Statutory Interpretation ........................................................................... 284 
1. Methods of Statutory Interpretation.................................................. 285 
2. Deciphering the Meaning of the Expert Fees Provision ................... 288 
D. Why the Arlington Court Made the Wrong Decision ............................... 292 
E. Schaffer v. Weast in Context.................................................................... 296 
V.  THE AFTERMATH OF ARLINGTON ........................................................................ 298 
A. The Impact on Children with ASD ........................................................... 298 
B. What Needs to Be Done Post-Arlington................................................... 300 
1. Revision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)............................................... 300 
2. Family Involvement........................................................................... 300 
3. Highly Qualified and Well-Trained School Personnel...................... 301 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 302 
I.  PROLOGUE 
Until its recent decisions of Schaffer v. Weast1 in November of 2005 
and Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy2 in 
June of 2006, respectively, the United States Supreme Court had not 
heard a special education case since 1999.3  Now, the Court’s renewed 
focus on special education legal disputes will likely increase the 
attention paid to this burgeoning area of the law.  However, along with 
this heightened attention come greater limitations on the rights of parents 
who have children with disabilities.  In its Arlington decision, the 
Supreme Court ended the protracted debate among the circuit courts 
over the meaning of “costs” under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  The Supreme Court 
held that the IDEA does not entitle prevailing parents in an action 
against a school district to recover expert witness fees as part of the 
“costs” associated with the litigation.4  In addressing Arlington, this 
Comment adopts a contrary position to that of the Supreme Court and 
argues that the majority wrongly decided the case.  Not only does the 
decision contradict the overarching purposes of the IDEA, but now 
parents bringing an action on behalf of their child with a disability will 
have to bear the financial burden of compensating experts.  In addition, 
Arlington will effectively deter many low-income parents from pursuing 
litigation when they cannot fund an expert.  This ruling is especially 
problematic for parents of children with an Autism Spectrum Disorder 
who, to successfully litigate an IDEA case, require experts to assess 
 1. 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
 2. 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006). 
 3. See Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999). 
 4. See Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2457. 
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services Stefan would receive to one day a week.   However, Newport 
 
whether the school district is providing an appropriate educational program 
for their child. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
For Brian and Juliana Jaynes of Newport News, Virginia, receiving 
the neurologist’s confirmation that their son, Stefan, was severely 
autistic was just the beginning.5 
Before his second birthday, Stefan knew his colors and his address.  
He could identify different flowers, and he maintained a vocabulary of 
250 words or more.6  However, after his second birthday he began to 
significantly regress, losing the ability to recognize words he previously 
knew.7  When the pediatric neurologist diagnosed Stefan with autism, he 
stressed to Brian and Juliana the importance of early behavioral intervention, 
emphasizing that there is “a window of opportunity and that window of 
opportunity is greatest between the age of discovery and as early as 
possible.”8 
Stefan’s frantic parents took action immediately, obtaining a referral 
for special education services from Newport News Public Schools.9  
Rather than placing Stefan in a program specifically tailored for autistic 
children, the school district enrolled him in a special education preschool 
for children with various disabilities.10  Stefan was the only student with 
autism in his class.11  Newport developed an Individualized Education 
Program (IEP) for Stefan but failed to implement it.12  After the 
Jayneses repeatedly contacted the school requesting that the IEP be 
carried out, Newport held another meeting and, without explanation or 
justification, revised the IEP, which reduced the speech and language 
13
 5. Laurie Tarkan, Autism Therapy Is Called Effective, but Rare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2002, at F1.  For an explanation of autism, or Autism Spectrum Disorder, see 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
 6. Brief of Appellees at 4, Jaynes v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 13 F. App’x 166 
(4th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-2312(L), 00-2575). 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 169. 
 10. Id.; Tarkan, supra note 5. 
 11. Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 11. 
 12. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 169. 
 13. Id.; Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 14. 
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unique.  Rather, the controversy over whether children with an Autism 
 
still neglected to supply Stefan with the minimal services provided in the 
revised IEP.14 
Following months of delays in carrying out the IEP, Stefan’s condition 
substantially worsened.15  The neurologist informed the Jayneses that Stefan 
was rapidly regressing and that if he did not receive appropriate behavioral 
intervention, he might have to be institutionalized.16  Stefan’s parents 
heeded the neurologist’s advice by immediately removing him from the 
public school’s program and placing him in a private Lovaas Applied 
Behavioral Analysis (ABA)17 program, which included forty hours a 
week of intensive behavioral therapy.18 
After the Jayneses incurred over $100,000 in educational expenses 
over the course of three emotionally testing years, they saw the return of 
their son.19  Stefan has dramatically improved in his language and social 
skills and spends more time engaging in social interactions and less time 
in his own silent, isolated world.20  And, according to his father, the 
behavioral therapy awakened his son’s personality, which was “truly a 
miracle.”21 
The Jaynes’ relentless struggle with the Newport News School District 
to secure appropriate behavioral therapy for their autistic son is not 
 14. Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 9. 
 15. Id. at 13. 
 16. Id. at 13–14; Tarkan, supra note 5. 
 17. For a discussion on Applied Behavioral Analysis as an early intervention 
strategy for children with autism, see infra note 69. 
 18. Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 169; Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 14; Tarkan, 
supra note 5. 
 19. Upon learning that they were entitled to a special education due process 
hearing, Brian and Juliana Jaynes filed a request for this hearing, alleging that Newport 
News School District committed several substantive and procedural violations of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  The Jayneses also sought to 
challenge the school’s IEP for Stefan and obtain reimbursement from the school district 
for the intensive educational services Stefan received at home.  The local hearing officer 
(LHO) found that Newport repeatedly failed to follow the procedures set forth in the 
IDEA and ordered Newport to indemnify the Jayneses of $117,979.78 for the educational 
expenses they incurred.  Newport then appealed the decision to the state review officer 
(SRO).  The SRO upheld the decision of the LHO, but reduced the award to $56,090.84 
based on his determination that the statute of limitations prevented the parents from 
recovering reimbursement for expended costs prior to the date the parents requested a 
due process hearing.  Brief of Appellees, supra note 6, at 18.  Thereafter, the Jayneses 
appealed the decision to the U.S. District Court, seeking reinstatement of the original 
award amount.  The court determined that Newport violated the IDEA by failing to 
inform Stefan’s parents of their right to a due process hearing and concluded that they 
were entitled to recovery of $102,929.45 of the amount accrued.  Newport then appealed 
the district court’s judgment to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.  Jaynes, 13 F. App’x at 170. 
 20. Tarkan, supra note 5. 
 21. Id. 
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parents of children with ASD 
m
 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD)22 are receiving an appropriately tailored 
education has become a hot legal topic in schools and in the 
courtroom.23  The increased legal activity has resulted from 
disagreements between parents24 of children with ASD and the school 
district regarding the methodology employed on the given student, the 
adequacy of the school’s support services, decisions regarding whether 
the student’s placement is in the least restrictive environment (LRE), and 
the length of services provided by the school district.25 
The noticeable increase in litigation by 
ay largely be attributable to the disorder’s legal recognition as one of 
the developmental disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).  In 1975, Congress passed the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA),26 which was renamed the IDEA 
in 1991.27  The IDEA was then reauthorized in 199728 and again in 
 22. The terms autism, Autism Disorder, and Autism Spectrum Disorder are often 
used interchangeably throughout the medical community.  Therefore, references made to 
(2002). 
ian (but not 
omises.  Part 
/
p. IV 
ified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000)). 
any of these terms in this Comment should be understood to encompass individuals 
diagnosed with any manifestation of an Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
 23. Perry A. Zirkel, The Autism Case Law: Administrative and Judicial Rulings, 
17 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 84, 84 
 24. The term parent shall mean a natural, adoptive, or foster parent of a child 
(unless state law prohibits the foster parent from serving as a parent), a guard
the state if the child is a ward of the state), a person acting in the place of a natural or 
adoptive parent (including a grandparent, stepparent, or other relative) with whom the 
child lives, a person legally responsible for the child’s welfare, or a person assigned to be 
a surrogate parent under the IDEA.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (Supp. V 2005). 
 25. L. Juane Heflin & Richard Simpson, Interventions for Children and Youth with 
Autism: Prudent Choices in a World of Exaggerated Claims and Empty Pr
II: Legal Policy Analysis and Recommendations for Selecting Interventions and Treatments, 
13 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 212, 212–14 (1998). 
 26. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. (89 Stat.) 773 (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1487 (Sup
2004)).  Before the passage of the Act, two prominent cases formed the foundation for 
what would become the EAHCA.  See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874 
(D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the Board of Education has an affirmative duty to provide 
specialized instruction adapted to the child’s needs that will enable him to benefit in the 
educational setting); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 
302 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding that the exclusion of mentally retarded students from 
Pennsylvania public schools offended due process and the right to a free appropriate 
public education, and, therefore, entering a consent judgment providing extensive rights 
to children with disabilities to address these inadequacies). 
 27. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587. 
 28. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (cod




2004.29  Through its enactment, the federal government placed on school 
districts and educators the affirmative duty to “ensure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education 
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet 
their unique needs.”30  To ensure that the school district adheres to the 
IDEA’s overarching purposes, the Act provides certain procedural 
safeguards to the parents of eligible students with disabilities.31  Some of 
these safeguards include a parent’s right to an impartial due process 
hearing, the right to bring a civil action against the school district or 
educator if the parent is dissatisfied with the decision rendered in the 
administrative hearing, and the right to be accompanied and advised by 
legal counsel and by experts having special knowledge or training 
regarding children with disabilities.32  Moreover, the IDEA provides that 
a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party who is 
the parent of the child with a disability as part of the costs associated 
with the litigation process.33  By including these provisions, Congress 
 29. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647. 
 30. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 
IV 2004). 
 31. The IDEA serves four stated purposes: 
 (1) (A) to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a 
phasizes special education 
  (B) 






 32. I 6), (i)(2)(A), (h)(1). 
i)(3)(B)(i)(I).  This Comment discusses the ability of prevailing 
i)(3)(B)(i)(I).  However, the IDEA does not 
free appropriate public education that em
and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare 
them for further education, employment, and independent living; 
to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of 
such children are protected; and 
  (C) to assist States, localities, educational service agencies, and Federal 
agencies to provide for the educatio
 (2) to assist States in the implementation of a statewide, comprehensive, 
dinated, multidisciplinary, interagency system of early interventio
services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families; 
 to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary tools to improve 
educational results for children with disabilities by supporting sy
improvement activities; coordinated research and personnel preparation; 
coordinated technical assistance, dissemination, and support; and technology 
development and media services; and 




 33. Id. § 1415(
parents to recover expert fees under § 1415(
foreclose the possibility—albeit rare—of a school district recovering costs against the 
attorney of the parent, or the parent, if the complaint or subsequent cause of action was 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” or was presented for an “improper 
purpose.”  At its discretion, a court may also award costs to the school district if the 
attorney of the parent continued to litigate the case after it “clearly became frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III). 
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is a difficult task.  
against a well-equipped school district—a burden that low-income 
parents will not be able to shoulder.41 
 
sought to ensure that the school district would not have a unique advantage 
over the parents in information and expertise.34 
IDEA-related cases involving students with ASD have caused an ever-
increasing challenge for school districts, parents, education lawyers, and 
advocates to afford the student a free appropriate public education (FAPE).35  
Although a substantial amount of research on educational interventions 
for children with ASD exists,36 researchers have yet to identify a 
specific behavioral approach that will yield positive results for all 
children with the disorder, which is largely due to the fact that ASD 
manifests differently in each affected child.37  Thus, while research has 
indicated that certain interventions produce positive outcomes, 
determining which methodology the school district ought to employ, 
based on the child’s unique set of characteristics, 38
Accessibility to expert evaluation for parents of children with ASD, 
therefore, is crucial to bringing successful claims against a school 
district for its lack of adherence to the IDEA’s requirements in providing 
the child an appropriate, individually tailored education.39  However, while 
parents may still utilize the expertise and recommendations of such 
individuals, the recent Supreme Court decision of Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v. Murphy now prevents the recovery of 
nonattorney expert fees to prevailing parents in an IDEA-related suit as 
part of the “costs” recoverable under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(B)(3) of the 
IDEA.40  As a result of this decision, parents will now have to bear the 
financial costs of experts if they seek to mount a successful action 
 34. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60–61 (2005). 
 35. Mitchell L. Yell et al., Developing Legally Correct and Educationally 
sm 
 at 150–51. 
on, supra note 25, at 216. 
the Legal System on Educational 
ial Ed?, TIME, Sept. 25, 2006, at 62, 63. 
Appropriate Programs for Students with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 18 FOCUS ON 
AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 182, 182 (2003).  For further explanation of 
what constitutes a “free appropriate public education,” see discussion infra Part III.C. 
 36. Rose Iovannone et al., Effective Educational Practices for Students with Auti
Spectrum Disorders, 18 FOCUS ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 150, 
151 (2003). 
 37. Id.
 38. Heflin & Simps
 39. Myrna R. Mandlawitz, The Impact of 
Programming for Young Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 32 J. AUTISM & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 495, 497 (2002). 
 40. 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2006). 
 41. Julie Rawe, Who Pays for Spec
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will adversely impact parents of 
ch
III.  AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER AND ITS UNIQUENESS                          
A.  Background of Autism Spectrum Dis
As one of the listed disorders under  Spectrum 
D
 
This Comment addresses how the Arlington decision, in disallowing 
the recovery of expert witness fees, 
ildren with ASD who seek to invoke due process against the school 
district.42  Part III examines the controversy between parents and school 
districts in providing the most appropriate behavioral interventions and 
therapies to the child with ASD and the reasons behind the increase in 
IDEA-related litigation, particularly with respect to students diagnosed 
with ASD.  Part III also explores the meaning of a FAPE, the procedural 
safeguards afforded to parents of children eligible under the Act, and the 
congressional intent behind the IDEA’s “costs” provision with respect to 
whether Congress intended expert witness fees to be recoverable as 
costs.  Part IV includes a discussion of the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Arlington and an analysis of the Supreme Court’s use of 
specific statutory approaches to interpret the “costs” provision.  Part IV 
also details why the Supreme Court made an incorrect ruling based on 
the legislative history of the Act and prior case law and describes how 
this decision, coupled with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Schaffer v. 
Weast, which placed the burden of proof on the party seeking relief in an 
IDEA suit, will discourage parents from challenging the school 
district.43  Part V explains how these decisions will impact children with 
ASD and emphasizes what must now take place from the parent’s 
perspective, post-Arlington, to secure an appropriately tailored education 
for students with ASD.  This Comment concludes that to uphold the 
IDEA’s purpose of providing the student a free appropriate public 
education, Congress must revise the IDEA’s “costs” provision to clearly 
express its intent to include expert witness fees as a recoverable cost by 
the prevailing party. 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE IDEA 
order 
the umbrella of Autism
isorders, autism is a complex developmental disability impairing 
communication and social interaction.44  Typically diagnosed before the 
 42. Due process is a term of art in special education.  Before a parent of a child 
with a disability or the school district can file a civil action in federal or state court, the 
See 20 
tis_home (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).  Autism 
 under Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD)—a 
parties must first exhaust all administrative remedies provided under the IDEA.  
U.S.C. § 1415(a)–(i), (l) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 43. 546 U.S 49, 62 (2005). 
 44. Autism Society of America, What Is Autism?, http://www.autism-society. 
org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_wha
is one of the five disorders falling
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ly more widely 
diagnosed today than it was in the past ten or fifteen years.50  ASD 
occurs in all ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic groups, and boys are four 
age of three, autism is the result of a lifelong neurological disorder that 
affects the proper functioning of the brain.45  Individuals with autism 
exhibit a unique combination of pervasive behavioral deficiencies and 
excesses, which negatively affect the most important aspects of life, 
including the ability to meaningfully engage in social interactions as 
well as communicate one’s thoughts or feelings with others.46  The 
disability is also associated with the presence of repetitive or stereotypic 
behavior, restricted interests, lack of pretend play in younger children, 
lack of joint attention, and abnormal sensory behaviors.47  Because ASD 
encompasses a myriad of specific behavioral symptoms that can range 
from mild to severe, children with the same diagnosis may manifest 
these characteristics differently.48  For instance, one child may flap his 
or her arms to show excitement in a given situation, another may 
respond to the same stimulus by smiling softly, and a third child may sit 
in the corner rocking back and forth apparently emotionless.49 
Once noted as a rare disorder, autism is undeniab
 
category of neurological disorders exhibiting varying degrees of impairment in many 
areas of an individual’s social, cognitive, and linguistic development.  The five disorders 
provided under the umbrella of PDD include Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, 
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder (CDD), Rett’s Disorder, and PDD-Not Otherwise 
Specified (PDD-NOS).  Id. 
 45. LAURA SCHREIBMAN, THE SCIENCE AND FICTION OF AUTISM 2 (2005); Autism 
ica, Characteristics of Autism, http://www.autism-
e generally R L. KOEGEL & LYNN KERN KOEGEL, PIVOTAL RESPONSE 
RE
merica, supra note 46.  Autism Spectrum Disorders range 
m
slaw, Autism, ASD, PDD, Asperger Syndrome, http://www.wrightslaw. 
SM LEARN 14 (2003). 
  
Society of America, supra note 44. 
 46. Autism Society of Amer
society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatis_characteristics (last visited Feb. 
26, 2008). 
 47. Se OBERT    
T ATMENTS FOR AUTISM 41 (2006) (discussing symptoms attributable to children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder). 
 48. Autism Society of A
from a ild form, such as Asperger Syndrome, to a severe form, such as Autistic 
Disorder.  If a child possesses symptoms of either of these disorders but does not 
sufficiently meet the disorder’s diagnostic criteria, medical professionals will typically 
diagnose him or her as having a Pervasive Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise 
Specified (PDD-NOS).  Rett Syndrome and Child Disintegrative Disorder are also 
included as spectrum disorders, but they are extremely rare.  See also National Institute 
of Mental Health, Autism Spectrum Disorders (Pervasive Development Disorders), 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/autism/complete-publication.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2008). 
 49. Wright
com/info/autism.index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 50. BRYNA SIEGEL, HELPING CHILDREN WITH AUTI






uring the 1991–1992 school year, 
th
 
 five times more likely to have ASD than girls.51  In 2004, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicated that the prevalence 
rate for autism was one in 166 children.52  However, data released in 
early 2007 found that one in 150 eight-year-olds in multiple regions of 
the United States have ASD, which translates into roughly 1.5 million 
Americans affected with ASD.53  According to the United States 
Department of Education, autism is growing at a rate of ten to seventeen 
percent every year, and the number of individuals affected will reach 
nearly four million in the United States alone within the next decade.54 
While it appears that ASD may be on the rise, part of this exponential 
increase may be attributable to greater awareness within the community 
and better diagnosis by medical professionals.  Due to differences i
iteria used to diagnose individuals, strategies to obtain relevant data, 
and population demographic characteristics, there remains variability in 
reported prevalence rates.55  One reason for the increase is that the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 
published by the American Psychiatric Association, which is the official 
standard used to diagnose children with ASD, has been continually 
revised to include more diagnostic criteria.56  It also now includes a 
reclassification of children previously identified under another disability 
category.57  Thus, children previously diagnosed with mental 
retardation, for instance, now fall within the spectrum under the new 
criteria if they also display autistic characteristics.58 
Another explanation for the dramatic increase in children diagnosed 
with ASD is Congress’s inclusion of autism as a recognized disability 
category under the IDEA in 1990.59  D
e nationwide educational system served a total of 5415 students with 
 51. Id. at 22, 25; Autism Society of America, supra note 44. 
 52. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Autism Information Center, 
rent 
generally A . PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
, supra note 50, at 14–15. 
to DSM-III-R (the revised third edition), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/faq_prevalence.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 53. Id.; Autism Society of America, supra note 44.  Note, however, that the cur
prevalence rate of autism, which was based on a study conducted by CDC’s Autism 
Developmental Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network, is not a representative sample 
of the entire United States population and should not be generalized to every community 
within the United States.  This data is only accurate with respect to the specific regions 
involved in the study.  Therefore, prevalence rates may differ in populations outside of 
the study.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 52. 
 54. Autism Society of America, supra note 44. 
 55. Iovannone et al., supra note 36, at 151. 
 56. SIEGEL, supra note 50, at 14.  See M  
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR (4th ed. 
text rev. 2000). 
 57. SIEGEL   
 58. Id.  At the time of the first major shift 
roughly a third more children became diagnosable with ASD.  Id. at 14. 
 59. Zirkel, supra note 23, at 84. 
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ailed to identify any effective means to 
prevent the disord  yielding positive 
results for all of those affected, or discover a cure.   Consequently, all 
as
 
ASD under the IDEA.60  The number of eligible students with ASD 
significantly increased by the 1999–2000 school year in which 65,424 
students with ASD received special education services—a 1108% 
increase.61  To put this in perspective, all other eligible students with 
disabilities served under the IDEA represented only a 26.3% increase 
during the same time period.62  Today, the IDEA provides special 
education services to more than 200,000 children with ASD in the 
United States.63 
B.  Early Intervention Strategies 
Presently, research has f
er, develop a specific treatment
64
pects of the disorder—ranging from etiology to diagnosis and the 
procurement of effective intervention strategies—feature differing 
viewpoints on the type of appropriate services for young children with 
ASD.  This lack of consensus has stirred up controversy among the 
scientific, medical, and educational communities, as well as families 
with children with ASD.65  Scientists seek to assess the efficacy of a 
given therapy by its methodology and replicability, while parents search 
for case studies or videotaped presentations of children who have 
obtained positive, concrete outcomes in communicative and social 
functioning using a specific program.66  Seeing such testimonials provides 
parents of young children with ASD the solace they need to select a 
treatment option that will be most advantageous for their respective 
 60. F. Edward Yasbak, Autism in the United States: A Perspective, 8 J. AM.
Y
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 52.  Based on 2005 
AN SERVICES, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON AUTISM 
  
PH SICIANS & SURGEONS 103, 103 (2003); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 182. 
 61. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 182. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See 
statistics, 193,637 children ages six to twenty-one and 30,305 children ages three to five 
received special education and related services through the public school system under 
the disability category of “autism.”  Id. 
 64. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM  
2004: CHILDREN’S HEALTH ACT OF 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/ 
research-funding/scientific-meetings/recurring-meetings/iacc/reports/autismreport2004.pdf. 
 65. Edward Feinberg & John Vacca, The Drama and Trauma of Creating Policies 
on Autism: Critical Issues to Consider in the New Millennium, 15 FOCUS ON AUTISM & 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 130, 130 (2000). 
 66. Id. at 131. 
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s and intervention produce dramatically better outcomes for 
in
child.67 
However, irrespective of this lack of consensus on the “most 
successful methodology,” extensive research has indicated that early 
diagnosi
dividuals with ASD.  The earlier the child receives a diagnosis, the 
greater the opportunity for the child to gain the maximum benefit from 
one of the existing therapies.68  While there are many therapies available 
for children with ASD, Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA),69 Discrete 
Trial Training (DTT),70 and the Treatment and Education of Autistic and 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Autism Society of America, Diagnosis and Consultation, http://www.autism-
society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_whatis_diagnosis (last visited Feb. 26, 
2008). 
havior Analysis (ABA) is an intervention approach developed in 
O. Ivar Lovaas that is based on shaping the child’s behavior through 
 individual analyses of the child’s functioning abilities to identify skills 
not 
 69. Applied Be
1987 by Dr. 
reinforcement mechanisms.  ABA focuses on the breakdown of skills into smaller 
distinct tasks taught by trained instructors in a highly structured manner.  The instructors 
conduct
necessary for improved performance and develop a curriculum based on the child’s 
strengths and weaknesses.  The intervention is then structured to produce appropriate 
behaviors through positive reinforcement and prompting.  For instance, if the child 
expresses interest in a toy, the instructor will prompt the child to ask for the toy using an 
appropriate form of communication.  As the intervention progresses, the instructor 
expands the reinforcement and gradually introduces structured time to allow for the 
integration of more difficult skills into the child’s developmental scheme.  The instructor 
will also work with the child to reduce inappropriate behavior by teaching alternate 
methods to communicate his or her needs in a more socially acceptable fashion.  See 
Daniel H. Ingram, Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions with Autism Spectrum Disorder, 
in COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 255, 258 (Rosemary 
B. Mennuti et al. eds., 2006); L. Juane Heflin & Richard L. Simpson, Interventions for 
Children and Youth with Autism: Prudent Choices in a World of Exaggerated Claims 
and Empty Promises. Part I: Intervention and Treatment Option Review, 13 FOCUS ON 
AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 194, 200 (1998); Autism Society of 
America, Learning Approaches, http://www.autism-society.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=about_ 
treatment_learning (last visited Feb. 26, 2008); The Lovaas Institute, The Lovaas 
Approach, http://www.lovaas.com/approach-method.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 70. Discrete Trial Training (DTT) is a method used for the implementation of 
ABA for students with ASD.  DTT sets forth a basic one-on-one approach whereby the 
instructor cues the student to perform, provides positive reinforcement for the desired 
behavior, and continually evaluates the student’s performance.  For example, the 
instructor may ask the child to match two shapes of the same color.  If the child does 
produce the desired goal, the instructor will facilitate the achievement of that goal by 
physically providing assistance.  The instructor continues this process until the student 
can independently perform the task on his or her own.  The ABA/DTT approach has 
proven to produce positive gains in the child’s IQ, language comprehension and 
expression, and social interaction skills.  However, while ABA is one of the most 
effective treatment methods available, it is also one of the most controversial.  Questions 
remain as to whether the ABA method ought to be used exclusively on the affected child 
(to the exclusion of other educational methods), whether the heavy focus on the child’s 
behavioral tendencies may ignore the underlying neurological characteristics of autism, 
and whether the extensive use of ABA and DTT therapy (up to forty hours per week for 
the given child) is suitable for the child’s needs.  See Heflin & Simpson, supra note 69, 
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Related Communication-Handicapped Children (TEACCH) program71 
are some of the most extensively utilized treatments in both home-based 
and school-based settings.72 
C.  IDEA’s Promises to Children with ASD: FAPE, IEP, and LRE 
As its first stated purpose, the IDEA proclaims that all children are 
entitled to a “free appropriate public education that emphasizes special 
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . .”73  
Essentially, a FAPE is a publicly funded and individually tailored 
educational program aimed to meet the needs of a child with a 
disability.74  The IDEA specifies that such an education and related 
services75 be provided to a child with a disability at public expense, 
at 201; Autism Society of America, supra note 69. 
 71. The Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related Communication-
Handicapped Children (TEACCH) program focuses on the child’s needs, skills, and 
interests rather than on the child’s behavior.  The approach seeks to assist the child in 
adaptive functioning by modifying the surrounding environment to accommodate for his 
or her specific characteristics.  Essentially, TEACCH develops an individualized 
du n
her supportive services necessary to identify disabling conditions in 




curriculum that emphasizes visual, rather than verbal, learning and uses structure and 
predictability to encourage the child to engage in spontaneous communication.  Many 
studies have validated the TEACCH model by illustrating its effectiveness in identifying 
the child’s emerging skills and adapting those skills to a modified environment.  
However, concerns regarding the program revolve around whether TEACCH places 
sufficient emphasis on the child’s social and communicative development and whether it 
employs an exclusionary approach, which isolates the child with ASD from other 
typically developing children.  Despite its potential drawbacks, however, the TEACCH 
method is largely used in a classroom setting and is a valuable method of instruction for 
teaching important skills.  See Heflin & Simpson, supra note 69, at 201; Autism Society 
of America, Learning Approaches, supra note 69; Division TEACCH, What is 
TEACCH?, http://www.teacch.com/whatis.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2008). 
 72. Division TEACCH, What is TEACCH?, supra note 71; The Lovaas Institute, 
Consultation Based Services, http://www.lovaas.com/services_consultation.php (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2008). 
 73. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 74. Mitchell L. Yell & Eric Drasgow, Litigating a Free Appropriate Public 
E catio : The Lovaas Hearings and Cases, 33 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 205, 205 (1999). 
 75. “Related services” entail student transportation as well as any developmental, 
corrective, or ot
children and to allow a child to benefit from special 
se ices include speech-language pathology, interpreting services, psychological 
services, physical and occupational therapy, social work services, school nurse serv
re reatio , counseling services, and certain medical services.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) 
(Supp. IV 2004).  The 2006 IDEA Regulations regarding the Special Education and 
Related Services provision state that “related services” include appropriate monitoring 
and maintenance of medical devices necessary for the maintenance of the child’s health 
and safety, including breathing, nutrition, or the operation of other bodily functions.  
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tive needs.  
then use the data obtained during the child’s assessment as a basis for 
the implementation of the special education services and as a 
under public supervision, and without charge.76  To ensure a state 
affords each child a FAPE, the IDEA conditions the state’s receipt of 
funding on its adherence to certain guidelines.77  Thus, the state receives 
assistance, based on the state eligibility provisions of the IDEA, if it agrees 
to identify children with disabilities, properly evaluate them, and 
implement an educational program suited to their respec 78
The “heart of IDEA,” and a vital component of a child’s FAPE, is the 
Individualized Education Program (IEP).79  The IEP is a written document 
produced through a collaborative process between the school district and 
the child’s parents that is designed to afford the student an appropriate 
educational program.80  While the IDEA does not enumerate specific 
services to be administered to eligible students based on their respective 
disabilities, the statute does require the school district to take certain 
affirmative steps when identifying students who may have a disability 
and are, therefore, in need of special education.81  First, the school 
district must carry out a thorough assessment of the child’s individual 
needs to determine his or her eligibility under the IDEA.82  This includes 
verification that the student fits within one of the enumerated disabilities 
defined in the Act and the determination that he or she requires special 
education and related services due to that disability.83  The school must 
measurement of the student’s progress.84 
 
Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R 
§ 300.34(b)(2)(ii) (2007).  However, such “related services” do not include a surgically-
implanted medical device, the optimization of the device’s functioning, or maintenance 
or replacement of the device.  Services do cover the routine checking of an external 
component of the surgically-implanted device.  Id. § 300.34(b). 
 76. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A); see also id. § 1401(3) (defining what constitutes a 
Supp. IV 2004). 
g eligibility requirements with which a state 
 § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2004); Autism 
 
ll et al., supra note 35, at 184. 
child with a disability). 
 77. Id. § 1412(a) (
 78. See generally id. § 1412 (listin
must comply during each fiscal year to receive federal grants under the IDEA). 
 79. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184. 
 80. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4); 20 U.S.C.
Society of America, Individualized Education Plan (IEP), http://www.autism-
society.org/site/ PageServer?pagename=about_education_IEP (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). 
Following the reauthorization of the IDEA in 1997, parents must now be included in the 
IEP process when making decisions on the educational placement of the child.  As equal 
participants in the IEP process, parents have the right to suggest goals for the child and 
provide any information that may be helpful in tailoring the IEP around the child’s needs.  
Upon completion of the written document, the IDEA requires unanimous approval of the 
student’s IEP from all involved parties in the IEP meeting.   Autism Society of America, supra. 
 81. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184. 
 82. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1). 
 83. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i); Ye
 84. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A), (c)(1). 
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hild, local educational agency 
(L
The second critical step the school district must take after confirming 
the student’s eligibility under the IDEA is to create an IEP team.85  The 
IEP team consists of the parents of the c
EA) officials, at least one regular education teacher of the child (if the 
child spends or may spend any time in regular education), the child’s 
special education teacher, and other supportive personnel.86  Together, 
the team develops an IEP that describes the student’s present level of 
educational performance and states his or her measurable goals—based 
on the child’s unique needs resulting from the disability—for one year.87  
The LEA must review the current IEP on an annual basis and must 
supply periodic reports on the progress the child is making with respect 
to meeting his or her annual goals.88  If the child does not achieve the 
goals set forth in the IEP, the LEA must then review the IEP and, where 
appropriate, make revisions to address the child’s lack of expected 
progress toward those goals.89 
 
 85. Id. § 1414(b)(4); Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184. 
 86. Specifically, in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, the Act requires the IEP 
team to be composed of the parents of the child, at least one regular education teacher (if 
the child is or may be participating in a regular classroom environment), at least one 
presentative of the school district (or LEA 
d’s educational plan and is 
 on the academic 
e
 the duration of the IEP.  Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III). 
 IEP reflecting the 
special education teacher of the student, a re
official) who is qualified to oversee and supervise the chil
knowledgeable about the educational curriculum and the school district’s availability of 
resources, an individual who can interpret the data collected during the student’s 
assessment and provide instructional options, any individuals with knowledge or special 
expertise regarding the child and his or her disability (at the discretion of the parent or 
agency), and the child (when necessary or appropriate).  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B); 
Candace Cortiella, IDEA 2004 Close Up: The Individualized Education Program (IEP) 
(March 24, 2005), http://www.schwablearning.org/articles.aspx?r=978. 
 87. The statement of the child’s present level of performance included in the IEP 
was revised in IDEA 2004 to illustrate the child’s educational achievements and 
functional performance and, thus, emphasize the importance of all parts of his or her 
development, rather than just academic performance.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).  Also 
note, with respect to the child’s IEP, the duration of the IEP is not based
school y ar; rather it expires twelve months from the date on the initial IEP.  See id. 
§1414(d)(4)(A). 
 88. The periodic reports must be supplied as often as the general education 
teachers supply report cards.  It is extremely important that the school district adhere to 
this requirement because parents need to be informed as to whether their child is 
benefiting from the educational program and whether his or her desired outcomes are 
achievable within
 89. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A); see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982) 
(identifying the IEP as an integral part of providing an eligible student with a FAPE).  
Both the school district and the parents may modify or amend the IEP after the annual 
IEP meeting without having to reconvene the entire team.  While the IEP does not need 
to be completely rewritten, parents may nevertheless request a revised
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ement decision, the team must look to 
m
ictiveness of the educational 
se
Finally, the IEP team must place the child in an appropriate educational 
setting.  When making a plac
any factors including the child’s adaptive behavior, social and cultural 
background, physical condition, and performance on aptitude and achievement 
tests.90  The team must also place the child in an environment that is 
conducive to meeting his or her IEP goals.  To achieve such goals, the 
IDEA requires that the school district educate the child in the least 
restrictive environment (LRE) as part of its guarantee of a FAPE.91  The 
LRE mandate requires mainstreaming, or educating the disabled student 
in a general education classroom with other nondisabled students to the 
“maximum extent appropriate.”92  When the child’s learning in the general 
education setting does not produce satisfactory results, the IDEA permits 
his or her removal to other special classes or to separate schooling.93  
Thus, although the IDEA favors integration, it acknowledges that the child’s 
needs may necessitate placement in a more restrictive environment when 
the general education classroom is not appropriate, even with the support 
of supplementary aids and other services.94 
With respect to children with ASD, a core concern among school 
districts and parents is determining the restr
tting.  Since the IDEA does not establish a framework for selecting the 
least restrictive environment for the student,95 the IEP team is left to 
 
changes or modifications made.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(F).  In addition, if any changes 
are made to the child’s IEP resulting from an agreement with a member of the IEP and 
the parent outside the IEP Team meeting process, such changes or modifications must be 
nclusion,” which is a 
t provides a standard the courts have used to 
e
eaming requirement.  First, we ask 
egular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids 
ces, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child.  If it cannot and 
l intends to provide special education or to remove the child from 




disclosed to the IEP Team.  34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(4)(ii) (2007). 
 90. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 184. 
 91. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).  The general education classroom would typically be 
the least restrictive educational setting for the child and a completely segregated school, 
institution, or hospital the most restrictive.  Id. 
 92. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. However case law has established a “presumptive i
presumption in favor of mainstreaming, tha
determin  the least restrictive environment for the student: 
Adhering to the language of the EHA, we discern a two part test for 
determining compliance with the mainstr
whether education in the r
and servi
the schoo
regular education, we ask, second, whether the school has mainstreamed the 
child to the maximum extent appropriate. . . .  [O]ur analysis is an individualized, 
fact-specific inquiry that requires us to examine ca
severity of the child’s handicapping condition, his needs and abilities, and the 
schools’ response to the child’s needs. 
iel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989) (citati
ted); see also Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983) (“In a case 
re the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whet
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decide, based on the child’s individualized goals and objectives, which 
“placement or combination of placement options” will produce positive 
outcomes before the expiration of his or her annual IEP.96  Due to 
varying interpretations of the LRE provision, placement challenges 
continue to surface, with some members of the IEP process favoring 
restrictive home-based or institutional instruction for the given child, and 
others believing the child can only benefit by full inclusion in the 
general education classroom.97  Still others stress that while segregation 
may be necessary for the child in an academic sense, the school must 
still mainstream the child in the general education setting for 
nonacademic activities, so that he or she can interact with nondisabled 
students “to the maximum extent possible.”98 
D.  Procedural Safeguards to Secure a Substantive Right 
While all students in special education are entitled to a FAPE, Congress 
has never provided a substantive definition of the term either in the 
IDEA or in any subsequent federal legislation.99  Some critics believe 
Congress’s omission was both intentional and strategic; recognizing that 
every FAPE would vary according to the child’s distinctive needs and 
goals, Congress sought to ensure that parents would be meaningfully 
involved in the creation and execution of their child’s IEP.100  However, 
despite this omission, Congress did set forth specific procedural 
safeguards for parents to protect their child’s guarantee of a FAPE.  
Consequently, parents have invoked these procedural due process rights 
PE for their particular child.  
rising from such a disagreement over whether a child’s IEP provid
the s perior could be feasibly provided in a non-
abilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809, 834 
 & Drasgow, supra note 74, at 206. 
1
e Karen Norlander, The Emerging Caselaw Involving Students with Disabilities, in 
dbook 
e , 2006). 
ervices which make that placement su
segregated setting.  If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be 
inappropriate under the Act.”). 
 96. Heflin & Simpson, supra note 25, at 214. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom 
Placement of Students with Dis
(2002). 
 99. Yell
 00. Id. 
 101. For a thorough account of recent cases brought under specific provisions of the 
IDEA, se
SCHOOL LAW SERIES (SIXTH ANNUAL) 81 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Han
S ries No. 160
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versus a school setting, or a certain level of intensity for the child, but he 
or she cannot indicate that the ABA approach, for example, is better than 
an adequate FAPE was the first special education case heard by the 
United States Supreme Court in the landm
ucation v. Rowley.102  In Rowley, the Court established the meaning of 
a FAPE under the IDEA and developed a standard for assessing whether 
the school district fulfilled the mandate for this substantive right.103  The 
Court explained that while public education is available to all students 
with disabilities under the Act, a FAPE requires more than mere access 
to special education services.  However, the Court also noted that “Congress 
did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational 
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”104  
In other words, the Court interpreted an “appropriate” education to 
include not a “guarantee [of] any particular level of education,” but rather 
one that is individually designed to grant some educational benefit to the 
child.105  Thus, the Court ruled that students with disabilities do not have an 
enforceable right to an education permitting them to achieve their 
maximum potential.  Rather, the IDEA entitles them to an education that 
is “reasonably calculated” to produce an educational benefit.106 
Significant to the decision, the Rowley Court emphasized that because 
courts lack the expertise necessary for evaluating the soundness of 
educational approaches, decisions regarding a school district’s c
ethodology are “for resolution by the States.”107  Therefore, as long as 
the educational practices adhere to the requirements set forth in the 
IDEA, the courts will not challenge the school’s judgment.  A hearing 
officer may, however, assess whether the methodology employed at the 
time of the hearing or trial is producing an educational benefit for the 
child and hold that support must continue.108  Moreover, the hearing 
officer may even support one-on-one instruction, an in-home setting 
 
 102. 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982). 
ether the school district has complied with the 
 State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act?  And 
Id. a
01. 
, supra note 39, at 496. 
 103. The standard for assessing wh
provisions of the IDEA in providing a FAPE to a student with a disability involves a 
two-part test.  To determine whether a child’s IEP provides “some educational benefit,” 
the Court asked: 
First, has the
second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s 
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits?  If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the 
obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more. 
t 200, 206–07. 
 104. Id. at 192. 
 105. Id. at 192, 2
 106. Id. at 204. 
 107. Id. at 208. 
 108. Mandlawitz
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the TEACCH program or other methodologies.109  Rather, this discretion 
is left entirely to the school district.  
The school’s decisionmaking authority regarding the choice and 
application of a preferred methodology, however, does not remain 
unchecked.  The Rowley Court specifically addressed and disposed of 
this concern, stating that “parents and guardians will not lack ardor” in 
actively seeking the benefits entitle
cause the IDEA affords parents numerous procedural safeguards to 
secure those rights.110  Furthermore, the Court read the IDEA as a 
mechanism for maximizing parental support, concluding that 
[i]t seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much 
emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large 
measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, . . . as it 
did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive 
standard.111 
tion 1415 of the IDEA enumerates these types of procedures that t
e educational agency (SEA), state agency, or local education
ncy (LEA) must establish and maintain to continue to obtain feder
istance.112  As previously mentioned, the IDEA guarantees parents 
a child with a disability the opportunity to participate in the entire IEP 
process, including identification, evaluation, educational placement, or 
any issue involving the provisions of a FAPE.113  Moreover, if the 
parents are dissatisfied with the school’s evaluation, they may request an 
independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their child at public expense 
by a qualified examiner.114  If the district grants the request, it must not 
unreasonably delay an IEE and it must consider the results of the IEE 
when assessing the child’s eligibility for services or when developing the 
child’s IEP if the IEE meets the agency criteria.115 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209. 
 111. Id. at 205–06. 
 112. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 113. Id. § 1415(b)(1). 
 114. Id. 
he school district denies the request for an 
voke a due process hearing to demonstrate that its evaluation of the child 
r educational needs.  Even if the presiding judge or 
evaluation to be sufficient, however, parents may still obtain an 
)(1); Technical Assistance ALLIANCE 
ation: What Does It Mean For Your Child? (2007), 
t lliance.org/publications/ALL11.pdf.  Also, the IDEA entitles the parent to 
 115. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (2007).  If t
IEE, it shall in
was in fact appropriate for his or he
hearing officer finds the 
IEE at their own expense.  34 C.F.R § 300.502(c
for Parent Centers, Evalu
h tp://www.taa
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initiate or change, or 
re
If any party is dissatisfied with the result of the due process hearing, 
they may appeal the decision to the state educational agency, if the state 
has a two-tier system, or they can bring a civil action in any state court 
The IDEA requires that the school district provide prior written notice 
to the child’s parents if the school either seeks to 
fuses to initiate or change, the child’s IEP.116  Not only must the 
school district include an explanation of why it proposes or refuses to 
take the specified action—including a description of the evaluation, 
record, assessment, procedure, or report it uses to base its decision—but 
it must also provide a statement notifying the parents of the 
procedural safeguards they may utilize under § 1415.117  In addition, § 
1415(b)(6) provides parents the opportunity to present complaints 
against the school district alleging a violation that occurred relating 
to the child’s identification, evaluation, placement, or the provisions of 
a FAPE.118  Following the filing of the complaint by the parents, the 
district is required to convene a resolution session within fifteen days to 
attempt to resolve the dispute.119  If the parents and the district are 
unable to reach an agreement, both parties may also seek resolution 
through formal mediation.  If the parents opt for the mediation process, 
the state must supply a list of qualified mediators knowledgeable about 
the law and regulations relating to special education and related 
services.120  The state must also cover the costs associated with the 
mediation.121  If, on the other hand, the parents request a due process 
hearing, either the state or local educational agency—as determined by 
the state or the state educational agency—must initiate the 
proceeding.122  For these hearings, parents have “the right to be 
accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special 
knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children with 
disabilities.”123  Hence, the IDEA entitles parents to the legal support of 
attorneys and experts in the field of special education law. 
of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States 
without regard to the amount in controversy.124  With respect to the civil 
action, the court will analyze the findings from the administrative 
 
only one IEE at public expense for every time the LEA conducts an evaluation of the 
child with which the parent disagrees.  34 C.F.R § 300.502(b)(1). 
 116. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). 
 117. Id. § 1415(c)(1)(B)–(C). 
 118. Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A)–(B). 
 119. Id. § 1415(e), (f)(1)(B). 
 120. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(C). 
 121. Id. § 1415(e)(2)(D). 
 122. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). 
 123. Id. § 1415(h)(1). 
 124. Id. § 1415(g)(1), (i)(2)(A). 
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g based on a preponderance of the evidence 
st







hearing and will hear any additional evidence at a party’s request.125  
After making its rulin
andard, the court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the 
costs” to the party prevailing in the suit who is the parent of the child 
with a disability.126 
While § 1415(i)(3)(B) states that a party may recover attorneys’ fees 
resulting from a favorable decision in an IDEA-related suit, it is unclear, 
based on the plain language of the text, what the phrase “as part of the 
costs” exactly entails.  The IDEA specifically affords parents the opportunity 
to be accompanied by counsel and expert witnesses knowledgeable 
about the child’s disability during a due process hearing or during the 
appeals process.  However, because Congress did not provide a 
substantive definitio
1415(i)(3)(B) does not indicate whether expert fees fit within this 
framework.  Despite the ambiguous nature of the IDEA’s costs provision, 
there is some indication in the legislative history of the IDEA that 
Congress intended for the term “costs” to encompass expert witness fees 
as well.  Of particular note is the Conference Committee Report No. 99-
687, approved by Congress while drafting the statute, which announces: 
The conferees intend that the term “attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” include 
reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of 
any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the 
parent or guardian’s case in the action or proceeding, as well as traditional costs 
incurred in the course of litigating a case.127 
Irrespective of what appears to be Congress’s desire to include expert 
fees as part of the costs, this language was never integrated into 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B).  For this reason, a circuit split developed; some courts
cluded that the provision ought to be read in a textualist mann
onstrating that the plain language did not include reimbursement f
ert witness fees.128  Other rulings, however, favored a more libe
 125. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(i)–(ii). 
 126. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), (i)(3)(B). 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1807, 1808. 
 128. See, e.g., Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2005); 
ry Educ. v. Springfield R-12 Sch. Dist., 358 F.3d 
aGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 481–82 
lark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1031 (8th Cir. 2003); 
f Educ., 7 F. Supp. 2d 655, 659–60 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Cynthia K. v. Bd. of 
Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Seconda
992, 1002 (8th Cir. 2004); T.D. v. L
(7th Cir. 2003); Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. C
Arons v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1988); Eirschele v. Craven 
County Bd. o








parents then sought the opinion of Marilyn Arons, an expert in the field 
of special education, to determine their son’s educational options.135  
approach to statutory interpretation, supporting the notion that the 
language set forth in the Conference Committee Report ought to be read 
in conjunction with § 1415(i)(3)(B) so as to afford prevailing parents the 
ability to recover such fees.129  The United States Supreme Court has 
now laid to rest the debate in the legal community over whether 
prevailing parents could recover expert fees in its recent decision of 
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy. 
IV.  SETTING THE PRECEDENT: ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
BOARD OF EDUCATION V. MURPHY 
In June 2006, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
hether the IDEA entitles prevailing parents to the recovery of
y expert fees in an IDEA-related suit as part of the “costs”
 1415(i)(B)(3).130  This decision involves Joseph 
urphy, who, at the time of the original action, was an eighth grade 
student at Arlington High School.131  At the beginning of the 1997–1998 
school year, a speech and language specialist determined Joseph had a 
learning disability in which he was “severely functionally language 
disordered.”132  Following this assessment, a neurologist examined Joseph 
and concluded he had a “near total incapacity to process language, 
written or oral.”133  Despite the recommendation of Arlington Central 
School District’s speech and language evaluator that Joseph be placed in 
a residential school for language impaired students because he was 
“‘high risk’ . . . both academically and emotionally,” Arlington Central 
proposed an IEP in which Joseph would attend Arlington High School 
and be placed in classes with other students with disabilities.134  Joseph’s 
After evaluating Joseph, reviewing the district’s assessments, and attending 
 
Educ., No. 95 C 7172, 1996 WL 164381 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1996). 
 129. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 




Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 242–43 (D. Conn. 2000); Bailey v. District of 
Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D.D.C. 1993); Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769 
F. Supp. 1313, 1323 (D.N.J. 1991); Doe v. Watertown Sch. Comm., 701 F. Supp. 264, 
266 (D. Mass. 1988); Hirsch v. McKenzie, No. 85-3199, 1988 WL 78859 (D.D.C. July 
21, 1988). 
 130. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 
(2006). 
 131. Brief of Respondents at 8, Arlington, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 05-18). 
 132. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 8–9
 135. Id. a
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 school year to date and to continue funding Joseph’s 
tu
IEP meetings, Arons “urge[d] Arlington Central to provide Joe with 
more intensive speech/language training.”136  Arlington Central, however, 
failed to grant the request.137  Joseph’s parents refused to approve the 
school district’s IEP and, thereafter, requested a due process hearing.138  
They also removed Joseph from the school, enrolled him in the Kildonan 
School, a private school for learning disabled students,139 and paid for 
his tuition costs.140 
Despite not having exhausted their administrative remedies, the 
Murphys filed an action under the IDEA in district court on behalf of 
their son, Joseph, seeking reimbursement from Arlington Central for the 
tuition costs of the private school.141  The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the parents, 
directing Arlington Central to reimburse the parents for the tuition costs 
from the 1999–2000
ition as long as the Kildonan School was his current appropriate 
placement.142  Arlington Central appealed, and the Second Circuit 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 355 
 of Respondents, supra note 131, at 9. 
ngton, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 355. 
 impartial hearing officer (IHO) presided over the initial administrative 
h
to meet Joseph’s educational needs and that the Kildonan School was 
gton Central to reimburse the 
s of a private speech pathologist.  Arlington 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 139. Id.; Brief
 140. Arli
 141. The
hearing, olding that Arlington Central’s proposed IEP for the 1998–1999 school year 
was not sufficient 
an appropriate placement.  The IHO also ordered Arlin
Murphys for both tuition fees and the cost
Central then timely appealed the decision to the state review officer (SRO).  While the 
appeal was pending, the Murphys filed an action in district court seeking a temporary 
restraining order that would require the school district to pay the tuition for Kildonan 
during the pendency of the appeal.  Id.  Before the SRO rendered a decision regarding 
Joseph’s appropriate placement during the 1998–1999 year—which, at this point, was 
completed—the District held an IEP meeting to determine his placement for the 1999–
2000 school year and proposed that Joseph return back to Arlington High School.  The 
Murphys rejected the IEP and continued to cover his tuition costs at Kildonan.  In 
December 1999, the SRO reached a decision, upholding the IHO’s award of tuition 
reimbursement but reversing the award of reimbursement for the costs of the speech 
pathologist.  The Murphys then requested a due process hearing to obtain reimbursement 
for tuition costs for the 1999–2000 school year, and in the still-pending district court 
action, invoked the “stay put” provision to require Arlington Central to pay for the 
current 1999–2000 school year tuition.  The Murphys contended that Kildonan was Joseph’s 
then-current placement and should remain so during the pendency of the proceedings.  
Id. at 356.  The District argued, on the other hand, that Joseph’s current educational 
placement was Arlington High School.  Id. at 357. 
 142. Id. at 368. 
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the expert fees issue.150 use Congress allocates 
federal money to state and local edu ial education 
se
 
affirmed the decision.143  The Murphys then filed a motion in the district 
court to recover $29,350 for the services provided by their educational 
consultant, Marilyn Arons.144  The district court granted reimbursement 
for Aron’s services but substantially reduced the amount to $8650—
compensating only for services rendered from the commencement of the 
initial due process hearing up to the district court’s ruling in the 
Murphys’ favor.145  These compensable services included facilitating the 
Murphys’ understanding of the school board’s experts, reviewing the 
technical materials to be used in the hearing, and preparing questions for 
the cross examination of the school board’s experts.146  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the legislative history of the 
IDEA, coupled with the dicta of House Conference Report No. 99-687, 
required the court “to construe the IDEA as providing for the reimbursement 
of costs such as those incurred here by Arons in conducting the expert 
evaluation.”147  Arlington Central once again appealed and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.148 
A.  The Majority Opinion 
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority of the Court,149 began 
the opinion stating that the fact that Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant 
to the Spending Clause provides sufficient guidance for the resolution of 
  The Court found that beca
cational agencies for spec
rvices, and because it conditions that funding upon a state’s 
compliance in meeting the Act’s requirements,151 these conditions “must 
 143. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 144. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 99 Civ. 9294(CSH), 
S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003). 
hours of consulting services between the dates of September 23, 1998 through 
ent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2455 (2006). 
 Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, 
,
 opinion, and Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices 
t a
2003 WL 21694398 (
 145. Id. at *9–10.  The court determined that Arons supplied 43 1/4 of the total 
146.75 
September 4, 1999.  Therefore, 43 1/4 x $200 (Arons’s hourly rate) totaled $8650 in 
fees.  Id. at *9–10. 
 146. Brief of Respondents, supra note 131, at 12. 
 147. Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 336–37 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 148. Arlington C
 149. Members of the majority opinion included
Kennedy  and Thomas.  Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, Justice Souter filed 
a dissenting
S evens nd Souter joined.  Id. 
 150. Id. at 2458. 
 151. For a comprehensive listing of the substantive and procedural requirements a state 
must meet in order to receive federal funds under the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (Supp. 
IV 2004). 
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expert fees.   In this study, the GAO directed the Comptroller General 
 
be set out ‘unambiguously.’”152  In other words, the IDEA must supply 
clear notice of the obligation to compensate prevailing parents for expert 
fees, which will enable recipients of federal money to accept or reject 
these conditions “voluntarily and knowingly.”153  The Court then looked 
at the plain language of § 1415(i)(3)(B) and determined that this provision 
“does not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds makes a State 
responsible for reimbursing prevailing parents for services rendered by 
experts.”154  Striking down respondents’ contention that the term costs 
should be read so as to authorize the recovery of all costs associated with 
the IDEA-related proceedings—including expert costs—the Court 
instead concluded that “costs” is a term of art that typically does not 
encompass expert fees.155  Congress’s use of the word costs rather than 
expenses, the Court added, is a further indication that § 1415(i)(3)(B) is 
not an open-ended provision that would hold all participating states 
liable for every type of expense incurred as a result of the litigation.  
Rather, Congress was simply expanding the definition of costs to include 
attorneys’ fees.156  Therefore, absent a clear reference to expert fees 
within this provision, the Court expressed that it would only look to the 
list of otherwise recoverable costs.157  These costs are set out in 28 
U.S.C. § 1920, which is the “general statute governing the taxation of 
costs in federal court,” and 28 U.S.C. § 1821, which provides a forty 
dollar per day witness fee for court attendance.158  When reading these 
statutes and § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA together, the Court concluded 
that the text “does not authorize an award of any additional expert fees, 
and it certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required under the 
Spending Clause.”159 
Next, the Court addressed respondents’ argument that a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) study provides a strong indication that 
Congress intended recoverable costs under §1415(i)(3)(B) to include 
160
 152. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2459 (citation omitted). 
 153. Id. (citation omitted). 
 154. Id. 
t 2460–61; see Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
o  4, 100 Stat. 796, 797–98. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2460. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. a
N . 99-372, §
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ling party in IDEA cases during a particular time 
fr
 of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 54(d),  which 
ge
to collect data on the amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses 
awarded to the prevai
ame, the number of hours spent by personnel—including attorneys and 
experts—involved in the action or proceeding, and the expenses borne 
by the parties to the action or proceeding.161  After analyzing the study’s 
directive, the Court stated that respondents’ argument would have had 
more persuasive force if the GAO had directed the Comptroller General 
to compile data on the awards to prevailing parents for expert fees.162  
But because the study discussed experts only in the context of assessing 
the number of hours they spent in IDEA cases, while making no specific 
mention of expert fees, the Court concluded “it does not follow that 
Congress meant for States to compensate prevailing parties for the fees 
billed by these consultants.”163  Thus, the Supreme Court rejected 
respondents’ contention. 
Following its review of the text of the IDEA, the Court directed its 
attention to two notable Supreme Court cases dealing with statutes 
containing costs provisions arguably similar to § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the 
IDEA.164  First, the Court focused on the reasoning and decision of 
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.165  In Crawford, the petitioner 
argued that Federal Rule 166
nerally provides for the award of “costs” to the prevailing party, gives 
the court discretionary authority to exceed the thirty dollar per day 
witness fee limit167 found in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b).168  Petitioners supported 
this assertion by emphasizing that while 28 U.S.C. § 1920169 includes a 
 
 161. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460; see H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986), reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1808. 
 162. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 163. Id. at 2460–61. 
 164. Id. at 2461 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); 
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)). 
 165. 482 U.S. 437 (1987). 
. R. C . P. 54(d). 
 from thirty dollars to forty dollars per day.  See 
9; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (2000) (providing in 
n attendance fee of $30 per day for each day’s 
tt all also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily 
 of the United States may tax as costs the following: 
arshal; 
 166. FED   IV   
 167. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) was amended after the issuance of this decision to 
increase the attendance fee for witnesses
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 314, 104 Stat. 5115. 
 168. Crawford, 482 U.S. at 43
relevant part: “A witness shall be paid a
a endance.  A witness sh
occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance . . . .”). 
 169. Section 1920 states: 
A judge or clerk of any court
(1) Fees of the clerk and m
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic 
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
(3)  Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
(4)  Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained 
for use in the case; 
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cision in West Virginia University 
H
interpreted this fee-shifting statute as having similar wording to that of 






list of costs that are taxable by the court, FRCP 54(d) supplies a 
“separate source of power [to the court] to tax as costs expenses not 
enumerated in § 1920.”170  The Court disagreed, however, holding that 
because the recovery of expert fees is strictly limited by § 1821 and 
§ 1920, it would not infer that Congress intended to override these 
statutes by a broader interpretation of FRCP 54(d).171  In the present 
case, the Court applied its analysis in Crawford and concluded that the 
term costs in both § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA and FRCP 54(d) are 
defined by the list of expenses enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.  Thus, 
in recognizing the principle set forth in Crawford, the Court here refused 
to permit the general reference to costs in § 1415(i)(3)(B) to essentially 
nullify the specific definition of costs provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 
absent explicit statutory authority.172 
Second, the Court relied on its de
ospitals, Inc. v. Casey as confirmation that the IDEA does not authorize 
the award of expert fees to a prevailing party.173  In Casey, petitioners 
sought the recovery of expert fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.174  In 
writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that § 1988 conveys 
no authority to shift expert fees to the losing party; experts are only 
eligible for the fees provided in § 1920 and § 1821.175  Following the 
examination of the language of § 1988, Justice Alito, in the instant case, 
Casey, the Court in Arlington ruled: 
ondents here, we would have to interpret To decide in favor of resp
identical language in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 as having exactly the opposite meanin
Indeed, we would have to go further and hold that the relevant language in t
 unambiguously means exactly the opposite of what the nearly identical 
(5)  ection 1923 of this title; 
pensation of interpreters, 
28 U.S.C. § 19
.S. at 441. 
ent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 
Id. (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991)). 
26 S. Ct. at 2462. 
Docket fees under s
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, com
and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation 
services under section 1828 of this title. 
20 (2000). 
 170. Crawford, 482 U
 171. Id. at 445. 
 172. Arlington C
(2006). 
 173. 
 174. Casey, 499 U.S. at 85–86. 
 175. Id. at 102. 
 176. Arlington, 1
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  In the footnote, the Casey Court 
com o. 
99- nt 
effo 180  
Wh  claim in Arlington 
language in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was held to mean in Casey.177 
The Court also responded to a particular footnote in Casey, which 
substantially influenced the decision of the court of appeals to award 
expert fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B).178
mented on petitioners’ reference to House Committee Report N
687,179 finding that the statement in the Report was “an appare
rt to depart from ordinary meaning and to define a term of art.”
ile this comment appeared to support respondents’
that the Casey Court viewed the Report as demonstrating a favorable 
interpretation of § 1415(i)(3)(b) and as attaching a different meaning to 
“costs” within the context of the IDEA, the Court disagreed.  Rather, 
without going into much detail, the Court stressed that the “thrust of the 
footnote was simply that the term ‘attorney’s fees’ . . . is generally not 
understood” to cover expert fees as well.181  Therefore, according to the 
Court, both Crawford182 and Casey183 reinforced the conclusion that 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) neither provides clear notice nor unambiguously authorizes 
a court to award expert fees to prevailing parents.184 
Finally, the Court addressed respondents’ remaining contentions about 
the fundamental purpose of the IDEA and the legislative history of the 
Act.  Respondents claimed that disallowing the recovery of expert fees 
would contradict the overarching goals of the IDEA in providing eligible 
students a FAPE and in safeguarding the ability of parents to contest a 
school district’s decision that negatively impacts their child.185  Finding 
these goals to be “too general” to provide sufficient backing for 
respondents’ assertion, the Court quickly disposed of their interpretation, 
concluding that the IDEA “does not seek to promote these goals at the 
expense of all other considerations, including fiscal considerations.”186  
Finally, respondents emphasized that a proper reading of the Conference 
Committee Report clearly reveals the intent of Congress to afford 
compensation of expert fees to the prevailing party.187  The Court once 
again, however, struck down respondents’ argument, declaring that 
 
 177. Id. 
2 n.5); see Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. 
402 F.3d 332, 336–37 (2d Cir. 2005). 
on, 126 S. Ct. at 2463. 
. Gibbons, Inc, 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987). 
 178. Id. (citing Casey, 499 U.S. at 9
Bd. of Educ., 
 179. For the exact quoted language from the House Committee Report, see discussion 
infra Part III.D. 
 180. Casey, 499 U.S. at 92 n.5. 
 181. Arlingt
 182. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T
 183. Casey, 499 U.S. at 102. 
 184. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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 the statutory phrase must 
be read in this manner.  First, he explained, the inclusion of an award for 
expert fees is exactly what Congress said it intended by the use of that 
 
legislative history is not sufficient to supersede the overwhelming legal 
authority that denies the recovery of expert fees.188  In Spending Clause 
litigation, a correct reading of a statute is not based on what Congress 
intends, but rather “what the States are clearly told” with respect to the 
conditions they must meet to receive federal assistance.189  Thus, for 
the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of 
the Second Circuit, denying the recovery of expert fees under 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA.190 
B.  The Dissent 
In disagreeing with the majority decision of the Supreme Court, 
Justice Stephen Breyer issued a powerful dissent in which he argued that 
congressional intent is abundantly clear in authorizing “attorneys’ fees 
as part of the costs” to include expert fees.191  Justice Breyer began his 
discussion providing two notable reasons why
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 2463–64.  Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority decision but, 
nevertheless, disagreed with the Court’s interpretation of the clear notice requirement in 
Spending Clause litigation.  Ginsburg stated that the Court’s reference to the clear notice 
requirement in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), 
should not be taken out of context.  She explained: “The Court there confronted a plea to 
impose an ‘unexpected condition for compliance—a new [programmatic] obligation for 
participating States.’  The controversy here is lower key: It concerns not the educational 
programs IDEA directs school districts to provide, but ‘the remedies available against a 
noncomplying [district].’”  Arlington, 126 S.Ct. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted).  Ginsburg also recognized that the IDEA was enacted not only 
pursuant to the Spending Clause, but to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.  
For this reason she stated, the Court does not need to rely on the clear notice requirement 
in reaching its conclusion.  Rather, the “twin pillars” provide ample support for the 
Court’s final judgment.  Id.  Ginsburg also noted that while it would “make good sense” 
when considering the overarching goals of the IDEA to include the costs of consultants 
under § 1415(i)(3)(B), Congress still did not provide specific reference to expert fees in 
the IDEA as it did in other statutes.  Id. at 2465; see W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 
499 U.S. 83, 89 n.4 (1991) (supplying a list of thirty-four statutes in ten different titles of 
the United States Code that explicitly shift both attorneys’ fees and expert fees).  
Therefore, Ginsburg stressed that because the judiciary is unable to rewrite the text of the 
statute, “[t]he ball . . . is properly left in Congress’ court to provide, if it so elects, for 
consultant fees and testing expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations 
already authorize.”  Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2465 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 191. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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phrase and, second, this inte e with the basic legislative 
purposes of the IDEA.192
Just as the 
pre se 
ver n 
Ed  to 
 
rpretation is in lin
 
Regarding his first point, Justice Breyer thoroughly discussed the 
legislative history of the IDEA’s cost-shifting provision, explaining that 
upon Congress’s enactment of the Handicapped Children’s Protection 
Act (HCPA)193 in 1986, it was already mindful of the need to award 
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties.194  In 1985, Senator Lowell Weicker 
introduced the pertinent bill in the Senate providing for the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees.195  Thereafter, several senators introduced a new bill that 
would cap attorneys’ fees but, at the same time, empower courts to award 
reasonable attorneys’ f see , reasonable witness fees, and other reasonable 
expenses resulting from the litigation in addition to the costs of a 
prevailing parent.196  Although some senators objected to the cap, no one 
objected to the latter portion of the bill.197  Another group of senators 
then proposed an alternative bill, which would “authorize[] courts to 
award ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee in addition to the costs to a parent’ 
who prevailed.”198  Senator Weicker explained that this bill would 
enable courts to compensate parents for whatever reasonable costs they had to 
incur to fully secure what was guaranteed to them by the [EAHCA].  As in other 
fee shifting statutes, it is our intent that such awards will include, at the 
discretion of the court, reasonable attorney’s fees, necessary expert witness fees, 
and other reasonable expenses which [are] necessary for parents to vindicate 
their claim to a free appropriate public education for their handicapped 
child.199 
The Senate then passed the bill without any opposition to Senator Weicker’s 
statement.200 
Senate expressed clear intent to award expert fees to 
vailing parties in IDEA cases, Justice Breyer noted that the Hou
sion of the bill reflected the same viewpoint.201  The Committee o
ucation and Labor created a substitute bill that would permit courts
 192. Id. 
 193. See generally Allan G. Osbourne, Jr., Commentary, Update on Attorney’s Fees 
ed the HCPA to authorize 
d reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in an IDEA lawsuit.  Id.  
 
ra note 196, at 17–18. 
. No. 99-112, supra note 196, at 
Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2467. 
Under the IDEA, 193 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1 (2004).  Congress enact
courts to awar
The HPCA amended the original version of the IDEA in response to the Supreme Court 
decision of Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which held that prevailing parties 
are not entitled to the recovery of attorneys’ fees under the Act.  Id. 
 194. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id.; 131 CONG. REC. 1361, 1979–80 (1985). 
 196. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2466–67; S. REP. No. 99-112, at 7 (1985).
 197. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2467; S. REP. No. 99-112, sup
 198. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting S. REP
15–16). 
 199. Id. (quoting 131 CONG. REC. 21387, 21390 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
 200. Id.; 131 CONG. REC. 21387, 21393 (1985). 
 201. 
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“‘a g 
par plicitly stating that “‘[t]he phrase ‘expenses and costs’ includes 




may question a school district’s decisions about what is ‘appropriate’ for 
ward reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs’ to prevailin
ents,” ex
expenses of expert witnesses.’”202  No member of the House objected to 
this statement.  When the bill reach
ouse introduced another bill that, in still authorizing the same award of 
expert fees, would add a provision directing the Comptroller General, on 
behalf of the GAO, to study and report on the fiscal impact of the cost-
shifting provision.203  Subsequently, the House passed the bill.204  Members 
of both the House and Senate then convened to discuss and decide on the 
two bills.205  During this meeting, they created a Conference Committee 
Report that included the text of the new bill, which was a combination of 
the House bill’s GAO provision and the cost-shifting provisions of both 
the House and Senate’s respective bills.206  Included in the Report was 
the statement that the “‘conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as 
part of the costs’ include . . . fees of expert witnesses.’”207  The House 
and Senate then, without opposition to this statement, adopted the newly 
crafted bill.208  Thus, according to Justice Breyer, in approving the 
Report and in adopting the bill, Congress made its intent perfectly clear 
that the costs provision unquestionably would encompass expert fees.209 
Justice Breyer then highlighted the IDEA’s fundamental purpose of 
guaranteeing each child a FAPE to support his contention that Congress 
intended to grant prevailing parents the opportunity to recover expert 
fees.  Justice Breyer explained that because the IDEA’s ultimate goal is 
to afford every eligible child specially designed instruction under the Act 
at no cost to parents, forcing parents to shoulder the burden of additional 
costs in an IDEA case would run completely contrary to the Act’s 
practical significance.210  Furthermore, the IDEA encourages meaningful
rent participation in every stage of the child’s education and 
enumerates specific procedural protections to “assure[] parents that they 
 
 202. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 5 (1985)). 
t 2467–68. 
oting H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. a
 207. Id. at 2468 (qu   
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1808). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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their child.”211  Thus, Justice Breyer emphasized, disallowing reimbursement 
for expert fees will diminish the parents’ faith in the IDEA as a means to 
successfully challenge the school district with an equal basis of knowledge 
and expertise. 
Justice Breyer also noted that experts are both necessary and 
expensive.212  Because the school district often retains many of its 
experts that are already on the staff, the “costs of experts may not make 
much of a dent in a school district’s budget.”213  However, Justice 
Breyer stressed, the denial of an award of costs may substantially affect 
a parent’s ability to utilize the services of experts in an action against a 
school district—and low-income parents may be forced to surrender 
their right altogether.214  Moreover, according to Justice Breyer, the 
Court’s concer
en the floodgates to parents receiving awards of “indeterminate 
magnitude, untethered to compensable harm” is unfounded.215 
Justice Breyer also did not find convincing the majority’s argument 
that the IDEA was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause and that any 
conditions Congress attached to federal funding must be set out 
“unambiguously.”  While conceding that the IDEA’s costs provision 
“does not clearly tell the States that they must pay expert fees to 
prevailing parents,” Justice Breyer nevertheless disagreed with the 
inflexible approach taken by the Court in requiring the Act to provide 
“clear notice” to the states.216  He noted that the Court has yet to decide 
a case involving a Spending Clause statute where it has req
ery spending detail be “spelled out with unusual clarity.”217  Rather, 
the text of the statute must simply enable a state to “assess its meanings 
in terms of basic legislative purpose.”218  Justice Breyer expressed, 
however, that irrespective of whether Congress set out such conditions 
“unambiguously” in the present case, the Court has held in a prior IDEA-
related case that this requirement “does not necessarily apply to 
legislation setting forth ‘the remedies available against a noncomplying 
State.’”219  Therefore, the majority’s mandate for linguistic clarity in the 
IDEA’s costs provision to warrant the award of expert fees is misplaced; 
such a reading of the Act “risk[s] a set of judicial interpretations that can 
 211. Id. at 2468–69. 
t 2469. 




 212. Id. a
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. a
J.  concurring)
 216. Id. at 2470. 
 217. Id. at 2
 218. Id. at 2471. 
 219. Id. at 2471 (citat
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prevent the program, overall, from achieving its basic objectives or that 
might well reduce a program in its details to incoherence.”220 
Justice Breyer then addressed how the Court read the IDEA’s costs 
provision as implicitly referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1920, which enumerates 
the types of costs taxable by a federal court.  Although this may be a 
possible reading of § 1415(i)(3)(B), Justice Breyer explained, it is not 
the only one.221  Instead, one can read the provision as being twofold: 
granting a “general authority to award costs” and granting the specific 
authority to award attorneys’ fees in addition to those costs.222  Reading 
the statute in this manner, according to Justice Breyer, may be 
“linguistically the less natural,” but it i
ely.”223  Furthermore, the majority’s reading of the provision as necessarily 
including the costs listed in § 1920 is inconsistent for an additional 
reason.  Because § 1920 is a federal cost-shifting statute, it only applies 
in federal courts.  Therefore, Justice Breyer argued, it seems contrary to 
Congress’s vision of the IDEA that a federal statute would define the 
meaning of “costs” for all IDEA cases when much of IDEA-related legal 
activity occurs in administrative and state court proceedings.224 
Finally, Justice Breyer discussed the Court’s “most persuasive 
argument,” which focused on the word costs as being a term of art.225  
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Court has traditionally excluded 
expert fees from the scope of the word costs and has interpreted the term 
in a similar manner in other cost-shifting statutes.226  However, he noted 
that the Court recognized in the Casey decision that Congress is free to 
redefine terms of art, even through a statutory provision such as 
Conference Committee Report No. 99-687.227  But the present case is 
different, Justice Breyer reasoned, because Congress did not 
 be used as a term of art as it was in the Casey decision.228  Rather, 
Congress intended the word costs to include additional expenses.  This is 
evident, Justice Breyer concluded, based on Congress’s acceptance of the 
GAO’s briefing report which stated that “[p]arents can receive reimbursement 
 220. Id. at 2471. 
t 2472–73. 
t 2473. 
 221. Id. at 2472. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. a
 227. Id. a
 228. Id. 
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under the IDEA as well y implications of this 
de
from state or local education agencies for . . . attorney fees and related 
expenses if they are the prevailing party” and “[e]xpert witness fees . . . 
are [an] example[] of reimbursable expenses.”229  Thus, following his 
analysis of the legislative history of the IDEA, the basic purpose of the 
Act, and the proper reading of the statutory language of the costs 
provision, Justice Breyer found that the majority’s decision to deny the 
recovery of expert fees to prevailing parents in an IDEA case is 
incorrect, for it “divorces law from life.”230 
C.  Understanding the Arlington Court’s Choice of                    
Statutory Interpretation 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington illustrate the 
multitude of issues and considerations underlying the application of the 
costs provision of the IDEA.  Although the decision stands for the exclusion 
of expert fees as recoverable costs under 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B), it 
also represents something much more significant: Arlington now marks 
the Supreme Court’s departure from securing a free appropriate public
for a child with a disability.  Before discussing how the 
s departed from its prior rulings involving eligible children 
as the resulting polic
cision, it is first necessary to understand why the majority adopted a 
strict reading of § 1415(i)(3)(B) and refused to look beyond the explicit 
terms of the provision to guide its decisionmaking.  Thus, an examination of 
the competing methodologies the Supreme Court Justices use when 
interpreting statutory law is important to develop that understanding.231 
 
 229. Id. at 2474 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: THE 
ATTORNEY FEE PROVISION OF PUBLIC LAW 99-372, at 13 (1989)). 
 230. Id. at 2475. 
 231. This Comment does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the 
various doctrines of statutory interpretation utilized by the Supreme Court, because 
offering a general overview of the Court’s approaches would hardly do justice to such an 
expansive and intricate subject.  Rather, a discussion will follow explaining two dominant, yet 
competing, approaches to statutory interpretation that appear to be controlling in th e 
majority and dissenting opinions in Arlington.  However, note that much scholarly 
attention centers on the Supreme Court’s canons of statutory interpretation, the benefits and 
approaches, and how these methods substantially affect the 
 holdings.  For an excellent discussion of prominent models of 
rpretation employed by the Supreme Court, see Note, Intent, Clear 
 and Legislative Intent, 
9–420 (2005) (discussing the shift in Supreme Court doctrines of 
a
drawbacks of the different 
outcomes of statutory
statutory inte
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982).  See also John F. Manning, Textualism
91 VA. L. REV. 419, 41
st tutory interpretation in the past two decades from one of “classical intentionalism” to 
one of “textualism” which has made a profound effect on academic writing and judicial 
behavior). 
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when deciding issues implicating a vague or ambiguous statute.   
These interpretative methodologies include what legal scholars and critics 
refer to as classical intentionalism,237 or purposivism,238 and textualism.239  
1.  Methods of Statutory Interpretation 
The concept of statutory construction, or a federal court’s 
interpretation of statutory language to ascertain Congress’s true intention 
of the law, symbolizes a balancing of powers of the three branches of 
government.  While it is Congress’s duty to enact federal law and policy, 
the Supreme Court has reserved to itself and the other federal courts, 
since the decision of Marbury v. Madison,232 the power to say what the 
law means.233  Therefore, the task of statutory interpretation is a shared 
responsibility among legislators, other elected officials, bureaucrats, and 
judges, which reinforces the constitutional scheme of separation of 
powers.234  However, the line between making the law and determining 
what the law means becomes muddled when congressional intent is not 
clear on the face of the statute.  As a result, the Supreme Court has 
historically resorted to doctrines of statutory interpretation to decipher 
legislative language in the context of specific factual issues when the 
federal statute at issue is facially ambiguous and unclear.235 
Although many canons of statutory interpretation exist, the Supreme 
Court has predominantly employed two distinct, competing approaches 
236
 
 232. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule.”). 
 233. Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: 
Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning 
Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 959 (2005). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 958 (describing that Supreme Court has followed the English rule in 
statutory interpretation, considering both the current plain meaning and prior legal 
context). 
 236. For an outline of certain canons of statutory construction “that presuppose 
Congress’s knowledge of and responsiveness to Court decisions,” see Michael E. 
Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme 
Court Statutory Decisions, 65 T . L. R . 425, 428 (1992). 
idence of Congress’s intent as “classical 
.”  See Manning, supra note 231. 
een the legislative and judicial branches). 
EMP   EV    
 237. For clarity, this Comment will refer to the view that the court must consider 
the legislative history and the statute’s goals and purposes in conjunction with the 
explicit wording of the statute for further ev
intentionalism
 238. See Craig, supra note 233, at 960–61 (referring to the purposivist approach as 
having the ultimate goal of effectuating congressional intent that preserves the balance of 
power betw
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ally opposed to classical intentionalism.  As a “surrogate 
fo
judges, including Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court, refuse to treat 
Classical intentionalism, a philosophy most often associated with its 
committed follower on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens, 
posits “the idea that legislation is a purposive act” in which Congress 
formulates relatively coherent policy objectives but often expresses those 
policies inaccurately in statutory text.240  Thus, according to classical 
intentionalists, it is the province of the judiciary to effectuate legislative 
intent by uncovering Congress’s unexpressed background intentions, 
purposes, or goals relating to the statutory language at issue.  Put differently, 
classical intentionalists emphasize the “fallibility of legislative 
expression.”241  Due to the “[l]imits on human foresight, imprecision in 
the tools of linguistic expression, and constraints on legislative resources,” 
Congress inevitably drafts generally worded text that fails to explain the 
variety of situations that may invoke the given statute.242  Therefore, if a 
statute’s literal interpretation produces a result that appears to be in 
contravention with the law’s background purpose, classical 
intentionalists assume that Congress “spoke clearly but inaccurately” in 
selecting the words to express its aims.243  Consequently, proponents of this 
theory advocate making use of the statute’s legislative history, 
committee hearings, conference reports, and prior case law as a means to 
provide contextual clarity to an otherwise ambiguous statutory term or 
phrase. 
Textualism, in contrast, represents a theory of statutory interpretation 
that is diametric
r actual legislative intent,”244 textualism emphasizes a literalist reading 
of statutory terms in which judges must “give precedence to semantic 
context . . . [and] enforce the conventional meaning of a clear text,” even 
if it does not appear to align properly with the statute’s overarching 
purpose.245  When discerning the meaning of unclear text, many textualist 
legislative history or references to explanations found in legislative 
debates and reports as authoritative evidence of congressional intent.  
Rather, proponents of this philosophy will only resort to “dictionary 
definitions, the statutory context, or . . . canons of construction” to supplement 
 
 239. See generally John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory 
Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009 (2006); Manning, supra note 231. 
te 231, at 894. 
 F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. 
 240. Manning, supra note 239, at 2009. 
 241. Id. at 2009–10. 
 242. Id. at 2010. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Note, supra no
 245. John
REV. 1, 3–4 (2001). 
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252  In addition, 
it is interesting to note that when juxtaposing the Casey and Arlington 
 
their interpretation.246  To support their position, textualists explain that 
due to the inherent complexity of the legislative process, interpreters 
cannot easily determine whether Congress proscribed a meaning to the 
written text apart from that which it expressly included in the statute.247  
For this reason, judges must not assume the role of the legislator by 
attributing greater meaning to the literal words of a statute, for doing so 
would amount to rewriting the law duly enacted by Congress.248  
Instead, judges must strictly adhere to the statute’s “chosen words” and 
assume that “what Congress enacts is precisely what Congress 
intends.”249 
Before the addition of Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court in 1986, the 
Court traditionally used statutory tools of construction that focused on 
“overall statutory structure, statutory goals and purposes, and legislative 
history” to properly give effect to congressional intent.250  However, 
over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has witnessed a noticeable 
change in posture in which its seemingly dominant method of stat
terpretation has centered less on the contextualization of a statute’s 
language and more on the literal meaning of its express terms.251  This 
recent shift toward textualism in the Supreme Court has, in turn, 
particularly influenced decisions involving expert fees. 
2.  Deciphering the Meaning of the Expert Fees Provision 
As a precursor to the expert fees issue in Arlington, the Supreme 
Court’s decision of West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey 
supplies perhaps the clearest illustration of the conflict between the 
textualist and classical intentionalist readings of a statute.
 246. Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation, 8 
t 420. 
g, supra note 233, at 961, 980. 
f & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 755, 758 (1995). 
 247. Manning, supra note 231, a
 248. Note, supra note 231, at 895. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Crai
 251. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikof
Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. 
Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687, 689 (1992); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624–25 (1990); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1598–99 (1991). 
 252. 499 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1991). 






ns, the majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate rema
ilarities in their overall treatment of the respective cases.  However, 
while Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Arlington gains textualist 
support from Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Casey, both dissenting opinions 
nevertheless offer powerful justification for reading unclear statutory 
text in a light favorable to congressional intent.  And, when mindful of 
Congress’s paramount objective in enacting the IDEA and the clarity of 
its explanations specifically addressing the recovery of expert fees, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Arlington provides even stronger rationale for 
why the Supreme Court erred in its decision by ignoring persuasive 
evidence of Congress’s actual purpose. 
As previously mentioned,253 Casey involved the question of whether 
plaintiffs in certain types of civil rights actions are entitled to recover 
expert fees as part of the “attorney’s fees” awardable under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988.254  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion examined the language of 
the provision and concluded that attorneys’ fees and expert fees are 
distinct items of expense.  Because the statute made no express mention 
of expert fees, the Court could not enlarge the statute to include within 
its scope that which Congress omitted, since doing so would “transcend[] 
the judicial function.”255  Scalia supported this argument by referencing 
thirty-four statutes that explicitly accounted for both attorneys’ fees and 
expert fees as separate types of recovery.256  Although recognizing that 
the denial of expert fees made the policy of § 1988 inconsistent with 
other statutes that preceded § 1988 and explicitly shifted such fees, 
Scalia remained steadfast to his textualist position, stating that when 
Congress provides for a particular meaning of a term, “it is not [the 
Court’s] function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy 
and to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat 
differently.”257  As a result, the Court held that due to the absence of 
express statutory authority, § 1988 does not permit the shifting of expert 
fees.258 
Just as Justice Scalia approached the expert fees issue from a purely 
textualist standpoint, Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Arlington also 
advanced this form of reasoning to ultimately reach the same conclusion.259  
Justice Alito alluded to the decisions of Casey and Crawford to reinforce 
his argument that because the IDEA does not explicitly authorize 
 253. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
supra Part IV.A. 
 254. Casey, 499 U.S. at 84. 
 255. Id. at 101 (citation omitted). 
 256. Id. at 88–90. 
 257. Id. at 100–01. 
 258. Id. at 102. 
 259. See discussion 
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hat specifically provided in the provision’s literal 
la
 
the Court for “put[ting] on its thick grammarian’s spectacles and 
ignor[ing] the available evidence of congressional purpose and the 
prevailing parents to recover expert fees, the Court could not give effect 
to a meaning beyond t
nguage.  While completely glossing over the policy reasons for the 
IDEA’s enactment, Justice Alito focused largely on the text of the 
statute, concluding that in Spending Clause legislation, Congress must 
clearly identify the conditions attached to those states receiving federal 
money.  However, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in a concurring 
opinion, Congress did not enact the IDEA pursuant only to Spending 
Clause authority.260  Rather, it was also enacted pursuant to Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a means to aid the states in complying 
with their constitutional obligations of providing children with a 
FAPE.261  Therefore, by framing the expert fees issue as purely invoking 
the Spending Clause, Justice Alito stripped the IDEA entirely of its 
contextual meaning, refusing to take into account other provisions 
establishing the right to expert assistance in IDEA proceedings as well as 
the Act’s legislative history in which members of Congress clearly 
communicated their intent for expert fees to be recoverable costs under  
§ 1415(i)(3)(B).  Not surprisingly, Alito’s particular reliance on the 
literal text of § 1988 as having “virtually identical language” as that of  
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) to strengthen his final decision is analogous to Scalia’s 
dependence on other fee-shifting statutes that either expressly permitted 
or denied expert fees to conclude the same.262  Therefore, although the 
resulting effect of Scalia’s reasoning in Casey was completely contradictory 
to the aim of affording protections for civil rights litigants under § 1988, 
and while Alito’s decision in Arlington completely avoided the significance 
of the IDEA in securing added protections to parents of children with 
disabilities, both chose to sacrifice consistency in policy for the sake of 
judicial deference to Congress’s duly enacted legislation—even though 
such a decision may not have been Congress’s vision in the least. 
Although a thoughtful consideration of the plain text of a federal 
statute and its pattern of usage is a necessary starting point when 
resolving a dispute, both Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer would not 
end the analysis there.  In his dissent in Casey, Justice Stevens criticized 
 
 260. See supra note 190. 
 261. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2006) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 262. Id. at 2462. 







teaching of prior cases.”263  He explained that it makes little sense to 
permit attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action, but 
simultaneously deny fee recovery for experts whose services
sential and provided a substitute for the time spent by an attorney.264  
Moreover, he warned that to permit the reimbursement for other 
categories of expenses and yet deny the same for expert fees “is both 
arbitrary and contrary to the broad remedial purpose that inspired the 
fee-shifting provision of § 1988.”265  Justice Stevens emphasized that the 
intention behind the congressional enactment of § 1988 was to overturn 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, which had 
disallowed the earlier practice of shifting attorneys’ fees and expert fees 
in certain federal cases.266  To support his argument, Justice Stevens 
referred to House and Senate Committee hearings and reports that all 
underscored Congress’s intention to shift costs under § 1988, including 
expert witness fees.267  Thus, Justice Stevens inferred that Congress 
sought to return the courts to their pre-Alyeska practice of shifting fees in 
civil rights cases so that those acting as private attorneys general could 
be made “whole again,” which would, in turn, encourage public interest 
litigation.268  And, shortly after the decision this inference proved true: 
Congress amended § 1988, which effectively abrogated Casey.269   
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer adopted a classical intentionalist 
reading of § 1415(i)(3)(B) in Arlington and refused to view the plain 
meaning of the costs provision from a literalist standpoint.  Breyer 
instead rooted his analysis in the Act’s underlying purposes and drafting 
history to give proper context to § 1415(i)(3)(B).270  Breyer found that 
the majority’s decision to overlook Congress’s objective to afford 
prevailing parents the ability to recover expert fees essentially stripped 
the Act of its practical significance.271  By disallowing such reimbursement, 
parents would no longer have the same participatory rights
ocedural protections, which is a “far cry from the level playing field 
that Congress envisioned.”272  Similar to Stevens’s approach in Casey 
 
 263. Casey, 499 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 264. Id. at 107. 
 265. Id. at 107–08. 
ess Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 
. at 108–11. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 
)). 
upra Part IV.B. 
 266. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wildern
(1975)). 
 267. Casey, 499 U.S
 268. Id. at 109, 111. 
 269. 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2000
 270. See discussion s
 271. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 272. Id. at 2470. 
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When retracing the Supreme Court’s rather liberal approach to 
regarding the expert fees issue, Breyer explained that the majority’s 
literal reading of the word costs in Arlington distorted the actual 
meaning of the term and rendered the remaining statutory provisions 
inconsistent.  He emphasized that such a mechanical application of the 
term for purposes of “linguistic clarity” cannot assist the courts in reaching 
sound results.273  By abandoning all consideration of congressional floor 
debates, hearing testimony, and committee reports, the Court did a 
disservice to not just those protected under the statute, but to those who 
created and enacted that statute as well.  Breyer also implied that this 
approach inhibited the courts from carrying out an important and 
necessary function: the interpretation of statutory law where Congress’s 
work product suffered from an omission or inadvertent error. 
While some textualists might argue that the omission of the phrase 
“expert witness fees” could hardly be a mistake, given the fact that 
Congress addressed the expert fees issue in committee reports and 
hearings prior to the IDEA’s enactment and expressly included the 
phrase “expert fees” in prior fee-shifting statutes, Justices Breyer and 
Stevens would disagree with this assessment.  Rather, as Justi
monished in Casey, “The fact that Congress has consistently provided 
for the inclusion of expert witness fees in fee-shifting statutes . . . is a 
weak reed on which to rest the conclusion that the omission of such a 
provision represents a deliberate decision to forbid such awards.”274  The 
Court must instead, according to both Justices, allow for the possibility 
of a different interpretation of the costs provision that is faithful to true 
congressional intent.  Thus, in criticizing the Court’s rigid approach to 
the expert fees issue, Justice Breyer illustrated how this inflexibility did 
little justice to the IDEA’s fundamental goals of securing procedural and 
substantive protections for parents and their children.  Now, just as the 
civil rights litigants had to await congressional amendment of § 1988, 
parents must also rely on the revision of § 1415(i)(3)(B) to undo the 
harm imposed by the majority’s decision. 
D.  Why the Arlington Court Made the Wrong Decision 
statutory interpretation in some of its recent decisions involving the 
 
 273. See id. at 2471; see also Gellhorn, supra note 246, at 764. 
 274. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115–16 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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 when disputes arise between 
parents and school districts and its vision that the core purposes of the 
Act wou provide 
children with disabilities 
IDEA, the strictly textualist method the Court applied in Arlington 
seems both arbitrary and improper.  This is especially evident in light of 
Congress’s goal of entrusting the Supreme Court with the responsibility 
of interpreting the provisions of the IDEA
ld guide that interpretation.  One of those purposes is to 
an appropriate education at no cost to their 
parents. 
Until recently, the Supreme Court has been faithful to its mission of 
carrying out Congress’s instruction and has aligned its reasoning and 
decisions in IDEA cases with the aim of maintaining the Act’s 
substantive and procedural protections.275  In doing so, the Court, 
despite its recent shift toward textualism, has placed considerable weight 
on the Act’s legislative history to properly interpret the meaning 
Congress attached to specific terms in the statute.  For instance, in 
Rowley, the Court strongly relied upon the Senate and House Reports to 
determine the meaning of an “appropriate” education because Congress 
never provided a substantive definition of the term in the IDEA.276  The 
Senate Report discussed statistics compiled by the Bureau of Education 
for the Handicapped, showing that only 3.9 of eight million children 
with disabilities were receiving an “appropriate education” in 1975.277  
This report also included a table illustrating the number of children 
“served” and the number of those “unserved” in 1975, and a similar 
discussion and table appeared in the House Report as well.278  The 
Rowley Court thoroughly discussed these reports in its decision to 
demonstrate that Congress sought to provide children under the Act with 
an “appropriate” education conferring some educational benefit, rather 
than one that would maximize each student’s potential.  The Court 
emphasized the importance of looking to the Act’s legislative history 
when attempting to define a statutory term, such as “appropriate” 
education, and explained that “[l]ike many statutory definitions, this one 
tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is 
scarcely a reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent.”279  The 
Court then concluded that “the Senate and House Reports unmistakably 
disclose Congress’[s] perception of the type of education required by the 
Act . . . .”280 
 
 275. See supra Part III.C–D. 
 276. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 195–97 (1982). 
. N . 94-168, at 8 (1975)). 
 No. 94-332, at 11–12 
Id. at 197. 
 277. Id. at 195 (quoting S. REP  O
 278. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975); H.R. Rep.
(1975)). 
 279. Id. at 188. 
 280. 
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sed to grant any leeway in interpreting the 
m
favorable to the Murphys.  Thus, the Court, in favoring a more literal 
reading of the statute, departed from the position it assumed in Rowley 
This comprehensive reading and application of Congress’s statements 
in the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Rowley, however, was 
hardly the technique employed by the majority in Arlington.  With the 
exception of the dissent, the Arlington Court barely even mentioned the 
drafting history of the IDEA’s costs provision, including the bills 
introduced by the Senate and the House discussing the recovery of 
 gain insight into the congressional intent behind its wording of the 
provision.281  The only time the Court did discuss an aspect of the 
legislative history of this provision was in its reference to the GAO 
Report.282  While it seems that Congress’s instruction to the GAO to 
study the “attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses” awarded to prevailing 
parties in IDEA cases, including the hours spent by attorneys and 
consultants, provides a clear indication that Congress expected 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA to be read so as to include expert costs, the 
majority found this interpretation to be “incorrect.”  The Court simply 
concluded that having knowledge of the costs incurred by parties in an 
IDEA suit might be useful in considering future procedural or fee-
shifting amendments.  Additionally, because the GAO study involved 
obtaining data on expenses that could not be taxed as costs, the majority 
found that it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended the 
recovery of expert fees. 
Even if Congress was unclear in its purpose behind the 
implementation of the GAO Report, it is still markedly apparent that 
Congress intended expert fees to be included as recoverable costs 
because it explicitly said so in Conference Committee Report No. 
99-687.283  However, the Court in Arlington overlooked the importance 
of this Report and refu
eaning of “costs,” despite its forthright acceptance in Rowley of using 
legislative history as a means to clarify an otherwise ambiguous term.  
Whereas the Rowley Court stressed that a statutory term that “tends 
toward the cryptic” does not provide an excuse for “abandoning the 
quest for legislative intent,” the Court here concluded the opposite in 
stating that the legislative history was not enough to render a decision 
 
 281. For a discussion on Justice Breyer’s Arlington dissent, see discussion supra 
Part IV.B. 
 282. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 283. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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vided by a qualified school 
nu
by failing to consult the relevant legislative history to inform its analysis 
on the proper meaning of an important term. 
Not only did the Supreme Court demonstrate a change in posture with 
respect to the weight given to the IDEA’s legislative history, but it also 
fell short in its once consistent commitment to ensuring that every 
eligible child receives a FAPE.  For example, in Cedar Rapids Community 
School District v. Garret F., the Court sought to uphold Congress’s 
vision of providing disabled children meaningful access to education in 
its broad interpretation of the “related services” provision of the 
IDEA.284  Rather than construing services pro
rse as excludable “medical services” under the Act, the Court found, 
in keeping with the purpose of the IDEA, that “related services” did 
encompass the type of care at issue in the case, despite the fact that the 
provision did not provide a clear definition of the phrase.285  Likewise, 
in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, the 
Supreme Court found that the IDEA confers broad discretion to grant 
appropriate relief.286  Noting that the term appropriate was not specified 
in the Act, the Court nevertheless authorized the reimbursement of 
tuition fees to parents who unilaterally placed their child in a private 
school after the school district’s IEP had inappropriately placed the child 
in a public school.287  In justifying its decision, the Court opined that 
“[a]bsent other reference, the only possible interpretation is that the 
relief is to be ‘appropriate’ in light of the purpose of the Act.”288  As a 
successor to Burlington, Florence County School District Four v. Carter 
also signified the Supreme Court’s commitment to the IDEA’s promise 
of a FAPE when it held that parents are entitled to reimbursement of 
tuition costs resulting from their child’s placement in a private school 
regardless of whether the school is approved by the state or complies 
 
 284. 526 U.S. 66, 73 (1999); see also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 
 
 n.6.  Here, the student was paralyzed from the neck 
985). 
883, 891 (1984) (holding that a service that permits a child with a disability to remain at 
school during the day is necessary to provide the child with the meaningful access to 
education that Congress intended). 
 285. Garret F., 526 U.S. at 74
down and required the use of a ventilator and other health services to attend school.  Id. 
at 69.  The student’s mother requested that the school district maintain financial 
responsibility for the healthcare services he required during the school day; however, the 
district disagreed.  Id. at 70.  In finding for the student, the Supreme Court held that the 
IDEA’s definition of “related services” includes ventilator services that can be administered 
by a school nurse.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the district had a financial 
responsibility under the IDEA to provide all the services in dispute to the student during 
the school day.  Id. at 77–79. 
 286. 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1
 287. Id. at 369. 
 288. Id. 
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This avoidance is especially evident from the 
C
, in isolation, does not 
 
with all the terms set forth in the IDEA.289  The Court found that while 
this holding may result in a significant financial burden on a school 
district that produces an inappropriate IEP for the given child, to read the 
relevant provision as barring reimbursement in this case “would defeat 
[the] statutory purpose.”290 
Together, these past decisions illustrate how the Supreme Court has 
turned to the underlying purposes of the IDEA to give meaning to a 
relevant term or phrase that is otherwise ambiguous standing alone.  
However, the Arlington Court took the opposite approach by 
circumventing the legislative purpose of the IDEA when it defined the 
meaning of “costs.”  
ourt’s rejection of the Murphys’ argument that their interpretation of 
the IDEA furthers the Act’s overarching goals of providing a FAPE to 
all children with disabilities and safeguarding parents’ rights to 
challenge a school district’s decision.  The Court simply determined 
these goals to be “too general” to provide a deeper understanding of the 
term costs.  Although the Supreme Court’s increasingly textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation provides an explanation of why it 
decided Arlington in this manner, such a conclusion still does not make 
sense in light of the Court’s past decisions which used a far more liberal 
approach to clarify the meaning of a vague term.  Moreover, the Arlington 
decision now impedes, rather than advances, the goals of the IDEA by 
imposing a significant obstacle for low-income parents, especially those 
having children with ASD, who seek to challenge the school district.  
This reality is especially poignant when taking into account the Court’s 
recent decision of Schaffer v. Weast.291 
E.  Schaffer v. Weast in Context 
At first glance, Schaffer v. Weast represents the Supreme Court’s 
concise holding that parents who challenge the appropriateness of their 
child’s IEP in an IDEA hearing must bear the burden of proof, unless 
state law specifies otherwise.292  This holding
 289. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14 (1993). 
 290. Id. at 13–14. 
 291. 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
t 62.  To clarify, the burden of proof in an administrative hearing is placed 
’s parents in 
rought the claim against the school district, Justice Sandra Day 
 applies with equal effect” to school districts seeking to 
 292. Id. a
on the party seeking relief.  Although the burden of proof was on the child
Schaffer because they b
O’Connor noted that the “rule
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seem to contraven he IDEA because 
parents still 
to an independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their child at public 
e the underlying purposes of t
retain all the procedural protections afforded by the Act.  
However, when viewing Schaffer in conjunction with the decision in 
Arlington, some of these parental safeguards seem to quickly dissipate. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in writing for the majority, attempted 
to dispel the notion that the school district bears a “unique informational 
advantage” by reiterating that the IDEA guarantees parents the right to 
review all of the school’s records relating to their child.293  The problem, 
though, is not necessarily access to the school district’s information; 
rather, the problem stems from the parents’ inability to synthesize that 
information without a special education expert.294  Expert assistance is 
critical to parents in IDEA cases because typically neither the parents 
nor their respective attorneys are “equipped to advocate the specifics” of 
what constitutes an appropriate IEP that is designed to provide the child 
with a FAPE.295  It is also largely undisputed that expert testimony is of 
critical importance to the school district as well; but the difference is that 
for the latter party, experts are readily available for consultation.  School 
districts employ internal experts who develop special education programs 
for disabled students and have the advantage of working directly with 
the child.296  When a dispute arises regarding the child’s IEP, the school 
district depends on these experts, which may include special education 
teachers, psychologists, guidance counselors, and other specialists, to 
testify on behalf of the school district’s position.297  Parents, on the other 
hand, do not have this luxury. 
In Schaffer, Justice O’Connor addressed this imbalance of expertise 
by noting that parents are not left without “an expert with the firepower 
to match the opposition”298 because the IDEA provides parents the right 
 
challenge an IEP.  Id.  Also, Justice O’Connor explained that in this case, the pertinent 
question was with regard to which party bore the burden of persuasion.  Because the 
parent’s evidence and the school district’s evidence were in equipoise (evenly balanced), 
the Court did not have to direct its attention to who properly bore the burden of 
production.  Id. at 56.  For a detailed commentary on Schaffer v. Weast, see Allan G. 
Osbourne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, The Burden of Proof in Special Education Hearings: 
Schaffer v. Weast, 200 ED. L. REP. 1 (2005). 
 293. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 61; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 294. Brief of Respondents at 23, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 
 expert witness testimony on behalf of the child’s 
ffer, 546 U.S. at 61. 
126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006) (No. 05-18). 
 295. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1036 (8th Cir. 2003) (Pratt, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the need for
parents in an IDEA suit and how denying the recovery of expert fees will foreclose the 
opportunity of many low-income families to successfully litigate their claim). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id.; Brief of Respondents, supra note 294, at 23. 
 298. Scha
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 as well as any other skill related to the 
ch
 money resulting 
fr
 
expense.299  However, obtaining an IEE does not extinguish the need for 
retaining an expert.  An IEE may include an evaluation of the child’s 
academic and cognitive skills
ild’s educational needs.300  But the evaluation likely stops there.  The 
IDEA does not require evaluators to review the evidence the school 
district will use in the due process hearing, develop questions for the 
cross examination of the district’s experts, or even testify on behalf of 
the parents at the hearing.301  Moreover, even if the evaluator were to 
advise the parents or testify on their behalf, there is no requirement that 
the parents receive these services at public expense.302 
Now, not only do parents bringing an action under the IDEA have to 
supply sufficient evidence showing the inadequacy of their child’s IEP 
to meet their burden of proof, they also have to bear the expense of 
hiring an expert even if they receive a favorable judgment.  For low-
income parents, the cost of retaining an expert is a considerable expense, 
and since parents who win against the school district generally do not 
receive compensatory damages, there is no surplus of
om the judgment to offset the fees of the expert.303  Furthermore, 
because expert testimony is, more often than not, a necessary element in 
IDEA due process hearings, parents who lack the resources to fund an 
expert are “left with nothing but their attorney to protect their rights” and 
the expert’s testimony on behalf of the school district “goes unchallenged.”304  
Therefore, Schaffer’s placement of the burden of proof on parents who 
attempt to challenge the school district coupled with Arlington’s denial 
of the recovery of expert fees produces a serious dilemma for low-
income parents: they must either relinquish their right to challenge the 
school district or place themselves in financial risk by having to shoulder 
the costs of an expert. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Wayne Steedman, Independent Educational Evaluations: What? Why? How? 
ttp://www.wrightslaw.com/info/test.iee.steedman.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 
Id. 
ges are not awarded to prevailing 




 301. Brief of Respondents, supra note 294, at 24. 
 302. 
 303. For a discussion on why compensatory dama
parties in IDE
th  Goal  of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act by Foreclosing Compensatory 
Damage Awards, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 659. 
 304. Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1036 (8th Cir. 2003) (Pratt, J., 
dissenting). 
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cks.305  As previously mentioned, there is no cure 
for autism and there is no reed upon interve tion program that 
has been proven hildren with the 
disability.  Desp thing is known: 
time is of the essenc dvise 
pa
promoting positive outcomes for their 
child and which ones are not.  Moreover, because a common attribute of 
 
V.  THE AFTERMATH OF ARLINGTON 
A.  The Impact on Children with ASD 
While the Schaffer and Arlington decisions will undoubtedly affect 
low-income parents who have children with any type of disability, this 
Comment argues that low-income parents of children with ASD may 
face even greater setba
single ag n
 to yield positive results for all c
ite these uncertainties, however, one 
e.  Following the child’s diagnosis, experts a
rents to begin intensive treatment “as soon as possible, while the 
child’s mind is malleable and the developmental intervention may have 
the best chance of achieving optimal results.”306  Thus, the immediacy of 
the situation causes parents of a child with ASD to look to the school 
district for support, entrusting its staff with the responsibility of 
developing and implementing an IEP that is designed to benefit their 
child and provide him or her with a FAPE.  But if the school district fails 
to evaluate all areas of the child’s disability and, subsequently, produces 
an inappropriate IEP, the result will leave indelible marks.307  The child 
may significantly regress as a result of improper treatment, and it may 
take twice as long to recoup the skills that he or she already possessed—
not to mention the child may already be at a lower educational level than 
other children of the same age.308 
Because of the complexity of the disorder, in which every child 
displays a unique combination of communicative and behavioral 
characteristics, it is unlikely that parents challenging a school district’s 
educational decision will be able to successfully advocate for their child 
without the help of an expert.309  In many respects, this is due to the fact 
that the parents are unable to regularly observe their child throughout the 
day in a school setting and, thus, may not be able to differentiate which, 
if any, intervention strategies are 
 305. See discussion supra Part II. 
http://www.autismpro.com/aboutautismfaq.php 




 306. AutismPro, Autism FAQs, 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
 307. See, e.g., Porter v.
that the school district’s failure to provide an autistic boy a FAPE resulted in significant, 
irreparable deficiencies to his educational, social, and physical well-being). 
 308. Systematic Treatment of Autism and Related Disorders, STAR 
S ries: Extended School Year Information, http://www.starautism.louisville.edu/images/ 
pdf/ESY.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2008). 
 309. See Mandlawitz, supra note 39, 
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e disorder is the child’s inability to fully communicate his or her 
emotions and needs, the parents may be without the help of their child’s 
input when trying to point out the deficiencies in the school district’s 
program.  For these reasons, parents of children with ASD require the 
assistance of experts that are knowledgeable about the disorder, are able 
to assess the specific needs of their child, and can determine whether the 
school has developed an appropriate, individually tailored program that 
will permit the child to benefit from his or her educational experience. 
Unfortunately, the Arlington decision now prevents parents of children 
with ASD from recovering nonattorney expert fees if they prevail in 
litigation against the school district.  While some parents will not be 
dissuaded from pursuing an IDEA lawsuit by the inability to recover 
expert fees, many parents of children with ASD will not have such an 
opportunity because they will not have the financial backing to fund an 
expert.  According to the Special Education Elementary Longitudinal 
Study (SEELS) conducted by the United States Department of Education 
in 2002, approximately fifty-one percent of families with children wi
SD have a yearly income of less than $50,000, and 16.3% of those 
families have an annual household income of less than $20,000.310  
These statistics clearly indicate that a substantial number of families 
with children with ASD do not have an income that will allow for 
additional expenditures such as expert fees.  As Justice Breyer admonished, 
while the costs of experts “may not make much of a dent in a school 
district’s budget,” the same cannot be said for low-income parents who 
will likely be unable to cover such costs, even if the fee is nominal.311  
Thus, although parents have uniformly prevailed in their IDEA claims 
when the school district’s program was deemed to be insufficient to 
meet the child’s need for intensive services, now Arlington and Schaffer 
together may foreclose the opportunity of low-income parents of 
children with ASD to pursue litigation altogether, even if their argument 
is meritorious. 
 310. M W ., U.S. D ’ EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE 
M SCHOOL S UDENTS W
ARY AGNER ET AL   EP T OF 
D MOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARYE  AND IDDLE T ITH 
DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 37 (2002), available at http://www.seels.net/ 
designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf. 
 311. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing expenses 
beyond those I  authorize.”313  
Therefore, in the IDEA to 
secure every chi on at no cost to 
parents, Congress should am o permit 
co
als who are charged with the 
responsibility of selectin ention option that will 
produce positive outcomes for the child satisfy the concerns of 
th
must include parents in all aspects of their child’s education.  This 
 
B.  What Needs To Be Done Post-Arlington 
1. Revision of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) 
In her concurring opinion in Arlington, Justice Ginsburg explained 
that the judiciary cannot rewrite the text of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).312  
Rather, she emphasized that “[t]he ball . . . is properly left in Congress’ 
court to provide
DEA and its implementing regulations already
keeping with the overarching purpose of 
ld with a disability an appropriate educati
end 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) t
urts, at their discretion, to award expert fees to a prevailing parent in 
an IDEA-related lawsuit.  Although it appears from the legislative history of 
the Act that Congress intended to include expert fees as part of the 
recoverable “costs” under the provision, § 1415(i)(3)(B) should still be 
revised to explicitly include the phrase “expert fees” as part of those 
costs.  Congress should also specify the other types of recoverable costs 
under this section so as to prevent any future confusion for parties 
litigating over this provision regarding what the term encompasses.  Not 
only will this simple revision allow for clearer interpretation, it will also 
substantially aid many low-income parents in their quest to obtain a 
FAPE for their child. 
2.  Family Involvement 
Children with ASD present special challenges for their parents and for 
the school district. Parents dream for their child to have a healthy, 
normal lifestyle.  When learning that a developmental disorder might 
prevent their son or daughter from achieving that high quality of life 
they envisioned, they seek out the best therapy available.  This places a 
heavy burden on school profession
g a treatment or interv
 and will 
e parents.  However, even with the IDEA mandate requiring parental 
involvement in the IEP process, many school districts have lost hearings 
involving children with ASD because they did not allow meaningful 
parent participation.314  Because the child’s parents play an essential role 
in the planning and implementation of support services, school districts 
 312. See supra note 190. 
 313. Arlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2464 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 314. Iovannone et al., supra note 36, at 161. 
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Reauthorization of the IDEA.317  These standards require 
the teac cation 
teacher or have passed the state sp ination 
an
includes ensuring that there are no delays in responding to the parents’ 
requests to evaluate their child, conducting the evaluation, developing an 
appropriate IEP, and implementing the IEP.315  If the school district 
actively works to keep the lines of communication open between the 
parents and the other members of the child’s IEP team, this will yield a 
stronger relationship among the parties that is built on trust and 
confidence.  Moreover, it is likely that less dissatisfaction will result on 
behalf of the parents because they will be aware of the services afforded 
to their child, the progress he or she is—or is not—making, and how 
they can effectively address any of their concerns.  This, in turn, will 
minimize the number of lawsuits brought against the school district by 
unhappy parents who seek to contest the appropriateness of their child’s 
IEP, and there will be less of a concern regarding the inability to recover 
expert fees. 
3.  Highly Qualified and Well-Trained School Personnel 
To ensure that the child with ASD is receiving an appropriate 
individualized education, the school district must employ professionals 
with expertise in the area of autism to conduct comprehensive evaluations 
and carry out effective intervention programs.  In doing so, the school 
district must establish that its special education teachers who teach core 
academic subjects316 meet the “highly qualified” teacher standards set 
forth in the 2004 
her to have obtained full state certification as a special edu
ecial education licensing exam
d hold a license to teach in the given state as a special education 
teacher.318  The teacher must also hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and 
he or she must not have had a special education certification or licensure 
requirement waived on an emergency, provisional, or temporary basis.319  
 
 315. Yell et al., supra note 35, at 187. 
 316. Core subjects include English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, 
foreign languages, civics and government, economics, arts, history, and geography. 
 317. 34 C.F.R. § 300.18(a)–(h) (2007).  Also note that Congress intended to align 
the IDEA with the No Child Left Behind Act by instituting new changes in the 2004 
the adoption of the “highly qualified” 
hind Act with some slight modifications. 
 that 
Reauthorization.  Some of these changes include 
teacher standards from the No Child Left Be
 318. Id. § 300.18(b)(1)(i). 
 319. Id. § 300.18(b)(1)(ii)–(iii).  For charter schools, “highly qualified” means
the teacher meets the certification or licensing requirements provided for in the state’s 
public charter school law.  Id. § 300.18(b)(1)(i). 




remove low-income parent cess scheme because they 




However, if the teacher is only providing consultative or collaborative 
support to a “highly qualified” teacher, he or she does not need full state 
certification.  Rather the special educator must have at least obtained a 
bachelor’s degree320 and must be receiving “high-quality professional 
development that is sustained, intensive, and classroom-focused,”321 
participating in an intensive supervision program,322 carrying out the 
functions of the teacher for a specified period of time that does not 
exceed three years,323 and showing satisfactory progress toward 
obtaining state certification.324  If a school district complies with these 
requirements, fewer substantive and procedural violations will occur and 
the district’s personnel will be well equipped to create and facilitate 
appropriate educational programs for children with ASD. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision of Arlington Central School District v. 
Murphy stands in the way of many parents who seek to challenge the 
school district’s IEP for their disabled child.  Foreclosing the award of 
expert fees to prevailing parents in an IDEA suit may
s from the due pro
 is especially troubl
ith ASD who require an expert to assess the behavioral and communicative 
complexities their child possesses and to determine whether the school 
district has developed an appropriate IEP to meet their child’s 
individualized needs.  Therefore, it is imperative that Congress revise 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) to specify the inclusion of expert fees as part 
of the recoverable costs.  In doing so, Congress will not only preserve 
the IDEA’s fundamental goal of protecting the right of disabled children 
to a FAPE, but it will also ensure that parents are better equipped with 







 320. Id. § 300.18(b)(3). 
 321. Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(A). 
S. 49, 61 (2005). 
 322. Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(B). 
 323. Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(C). 
 324. Id. § 300.18(b)(2)(i)(D). 
 325. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.
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